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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The refugee crisis facing Europe has caused consternation in the corridors of power, and heated debate on 
Europe’s streets. It has exposed fundamental faultlines in the whole European project, as governments fail 
to agree on even limited sharing of refugees and instead blame each other. Far-right parties have surged in 
popularity exploiting austerity-impacted communities in putting the blame for economic recession on a convenient 
scapegoat as opposed to the powerful banking sector. This has been most potently seen in the UK, where leaders 
of the ‘Leave EU’ campaign unscrupulously amplified fears of mass migration to successfully mobilise support 
for Brexit.   Refugees fleeing terrible violence and hardship have been caught in the crossfire; forced to take ever 
more dangerous routes to get to Europe and facing racist attacks in host nations when they finally arrive.
However there is one group of interests that have only benefited from the refugee crisis, and in particular 
from the European Union’s investment in ‘securing’ its borders. They are the military and security 
companies that provide the equipment to border guards, the surveillance technology to monitor frontiers, 
and the IT infrastructure to track population movements. 
This report turns a spotlight on those border security profiteers, examining who they are and the services 
they provide, how they both influence and benefit from European policies and what funding they receive from 
taxpayers. The report shows that far from being passive beneficiaries of EU largesse, these corporations are 
actively encouraging a growing securitisation of Europe’s borders, and willing to provide ever more draconian 
technologies to do this. 
Most perverse of all, it shows that some of the beneficiaries of border security contracts are some of the 
biggest arms sellers to the Middle-East and North-African region, fuelling the conflicts that are the cause 
of many of the refugees. In other words, the companies creating the crisis are then profiting from it. 
Moreover they have been abetted by European states who have granted the licences to export arms and have then 
granted them border security contracts to deal with the consequences. Their actions are also in the framework of 
an increasingly militarised response to the refugee crisis by the European Union.
Under the banner of ‘fighting illegal immigration’, the European Commission plans to transform its border security 
agency Frontex into a more powerful European Border and Coast Guard Agency. This would have control over 
member states border security efforts and a more active role as a border guard itself, including purchasing its 
own equipment. The agency is backed up by EUROSUR, an EU system connecting member and third states’ 
border security surveillance and monitoring systems.
Militarisation of border security is also demonstrated by the military objectives of the ‘European Union Naval 
Force – Mediterranean Operation Sophia’ (EUNAVFOR MED) as well as the use of military on many borders, 
including Hungary, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. NATO naval missions in the Mediterranean are already 
actively assisting EU border security.
Meanwhile, countries outside the EU are being pushed to take up a role as outpost border guards to try to stop 
refugees from reaching the EU borders. The recent EU migration deals with Turkey, which have been severely 
criticised by human rights organisations, deny refugees access to Europe and have resulted in more violence 
against them.
The report shows that:
• The border security market is booming. Estimated at some 15 billion euros in 2015, it is predicted  
to rise to over 29 billion euros annually in 2022
• The arms business, in particular sales to the Middle-East and North-Africa, where most of  
the refugees are fleeing from, is also booming. Global arms exports to the Middle-East actually  
increased by 61 per cent between 2006–10 and 2011–15. Between 2005 and 2014, EU member states 
granted arms exports licences to the Middle East and North Africa worth over 82 billion euros
• The European policy response to refugees which has focused on targeting traffickers  
and strengthening its external borders (including in countries outside the European Union)  
has led to big budget increases which benefits industry
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 – Total EU funding for member state border security measures through its main funding programmes 
is 4.5 billion euros between 2004 and 2020
 – Frontex, its main border control agency’s budget increased 3,688% between 2005 and 2016  
(from €6.3m to €238.7m)
 – EU new member states have been required to strengthen borders as a condition of membership, 
creating additional markets for profit. Equipment purchased or upgraded with External Borders 
Fund money includes 54 border surveillance systems, 22,347 items of operating equipment for 
border surveillance and 212,881 items of operating equipment for border checks
 – Some of the arms sales permits to the Middle-East and North Africa are also intended for border 
control. In 2015, for example the Dutch government granted a 34 million euro export license to 
Thales Nederland for the delivery of radar and C3-systems to Egypt despite reports of human right 
violations in the country
• The European border security industry is dominated by major arms companies, who have all  
set up or expanded security divisions as well as a number of smaller IT and specialist security firms.  
Italian arms giant Finmeccanica identified “border control and security systems” as one of the primary 
drivers for increase in orders and revenues
• The big players in Europe’s border security complex include arms companies Airbus, Finmeccanica, 
Thales and Safran, as well as technology giant Indra. Finmeccanica and Airbus have been particularly 
prominent winners of EU contracts aimed at strengthening borders. Airbus is also the number one 
winner of EU security research funding contracts
• Finmecannica, Thales and Airbus, prominent players in the EU security business are also three of  
the top four European arms traders, all active selling to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Their total revenues in 2015 amounted to 95 billion euros
• Israeli companies are the only non-European receivers of research funding (thanks to a 1996 
agreement between Israel and the EU) and also have played a role in fortifying the borders of 
Bulgaria and Hungary, and promote their expertise based on the West Bank separation wall and the  
Gaza border with Egypt. Israeli firm BTec Electronic Security Systems, selected by Frontex to participate  
in its April 2014 workshop on ‘Border Surveillance Sensors and Platforms’, boasted in its application mail  
that its “technologies, solutions and products are installed on [the] Israeli-Palestinian border”
• The arms and security industry helps shape European border security policy through lobbying, through 
its regular interactions with EU’s border institutions and through its shaping of research policy. The European 
Organisation for Security (EOS), which includes Thales, Finmecannica and Airbus has been most active in 
lobbying for increased border security. Many of its proposals, such as its push to set up a cross European 
border security agency have eventually ended up as policy – see for example the transformation of Frontex 
into the European Border and Coastguard Agency (EBCG). Moreover Frontex/EBCG’s biannual industry days 
and its participation in special security roundtables and specialist arms and security fairs ensure regular 
communication and a natural affinity for cooperation.
• The arms and security industry has successfully captured the 316 million euros funding provided for 
research in security issues, setting the agenda for research, carrying it out, and then often benefiting from 
the subsequent contracts that result. Since 2002, the EU has funded 56 projects in the field of border security 
and border control.
Collectively the evidence shows a growing convergence of interests between Europe’s political leaders 
seeking to militarise the borders and its major defence and security contractors who provide the services. 
But this is not just an issue of conflicts of interest or of profiteering from crisis, it is also about the direction 
Europe takes at this critical moment. More than a half century ago, then US President Eisenhower warned of the 
dangers of a military-industrial complex, whose power could “endanger our liberties or democratic processes”. 
Today we have an even more powerful military-security-industrial complex, using technologies that point 
outwards and inwards, that right now are targeted at some of the most vulnerable desperate people on our 
planet. Allowing this complex to escape unexamined poses a threat to democracy and to a Europe built on an 
ideal of cooperation and peace. As Eisenhower put it: “Down the long lane of the history yet to be written... 
this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be 
instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.”
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“Arms and technology companies have reaped 
the main windfalls from Europe’s delusional 
‘fight against illegal migration’.”
– Hein de Haas, professor of migration studies at the University of Amsterdam1
INTRODUCTION 
THE EU WAR  
ON IMMIGRATION
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The journey of Syrian refugees in search of a safe future in Europe is one that is 
marked by violence. Leaving a war-torn country, where families have witnessed 
brutal experiences of death and destruction, they then come face to face with more 
violence on Europe’s borders. Whether they travel by sea or over land, whether they 
use highly paid ‘services’ of traffickers or journey alone, militarised borders are there 
to greet them. Frontex and NATO patrols in the Aegean Sea, assisted by advanced 
surveillance systems, are actively seeking to halt refugee boats. In Greece, refugees 
face teargas from police or attacks from Greek paramilitaries. The land borders with 
Bulgaria and Macedonia are sealed off by razor-wire security fences, with soldiers 
patrolling the borders. Even if they are able to find their way through all of these 
obstacles, refugees continually face the distinct possibilities of detention, deportation 
or attacks by extreme-right gangs. Welcome to Europe, scene of a war on immigration.
Hamed Shurbaji, 24, majored in French literature 
at Damascus University when the revolution in 
Syria erupted. He learned he was wanted by the 
regime because of his involvement in the peaceful 
protests during the first year of the movement 
in 2011. “I couldn’t stand it any more,” Shurbaji 
explained. “My home town Darya was totally 
destroyed and I lost a lot of family members. 
I couldn’t stay while the security forces were 
killing innocent people. There was nothing left 
for me there any more, when all my loved ones 
were either jailed, killed or scattered abroad.”
He decided to travel to Libya to find a way to 
Europe. He was able to reach the Libyan border 
and tried to sneak across it. He spent a day and a 
half walking on foot near the border in an effort 
to enter, but he was caught by the Libyan guards. 
He was accused of being a jihadist who intended 
to fight in Libya. He was detained and jailed for a 
few days before he was released.
He headed to Zowara, the Libyan coastal city 
near Tunisia, where he met a people smuggler. 
“It took me a whole month to finally get on a boat 
to Europe, but unfortunately it did not work. 
The Libyan coast guards stormed the boat and 
detained us all for two days and then let us go,” 
Hamed said, describing his first attempt.
His third and final attempt was the most bizarre 
and horrible of them all. On a two-level boat, the 
smugglers this time managed to cram in more 
than 730 people. “We did not expect to see this 
many people all at once on the same boat,” 
Hamed said. “After few hours of sailing in sea, 
the boat started to sink and water started to leak 
inside the boat. We started to bail the water out 
using buckets for at least 24 hours nonstop.” 
A few hours later, they noticed a helicopter in the 
horizon. It circled around them in the air for few 
minutes then left. “Right after that, we saw a ship 
with a Danish flag approaching us fast,” Hamed 
said. “While we tried to get close to it, the big ship 
hit the nose of our boat and made it sink even 
faster.” It took at least five hours to rescue 
people, and then only with the aid of the Maltese 
coast guard. Nevertheless, for some it was too 
late. Nine people drowned and 30 others who 
were in the lower level of the boat suffocated to 
death from the smoke from the engine and died, 
Hamed explained.
The rescue boat dropped them off in Catania, 
Sicily. “My friend and I headed to France after 
that, but we were caught by the French police, 
who took our fingerprints and sent us back to 
Italy,” Hamed declared. Back in Milan, they met 
a smuggler who took them by car and smuggled 
them into Germany. Once he entered Germany, 
he turned himself in to the German police in 
Dortmund.
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After three months in Germany, Hamed was 
finally granted refugee status and became a legal 
resident of Germany.2
By the end of 2015 there were over 60 million 
persons on the move in this world, according 
to the UNHCR. Most of them are sheltered 
somewhere within their countries of origin or in 
neighbouring countries. Europe, which has rung 
the alarm about a so-called ‘refugee crisis’ since 
last summer, was reached by an estimated just 
over one million migrants in 2015. This is only 
a very small portion of the global number of 
displaced people. In 2014 “[d]eveloping countries 
housed over 86% of the world’s refugees, 
compared to 70% ten years ago.”3
Nevertheless, media and official discourse in the 
EU is dominated by unprecedented panic. 2015 
and the first months of 2016 have witnessed a 
grim picture of rapidly increasing border security, 
increasing use of military personnel and means, 
and regular EU-meetings, trying to find ‘solutions’ 
to stop refugees coming to Europe.
Experts, human rights organizations and activists 
have warned time after time that militarisation 
of the EU external borders won’t stop desperate 
people from trying to enter Europe. Instead it 
will only force them to take more risks, including 
switching to ever more dangerous migration 
routes.
And indeed, the consequences of EU measures 
in recent years to ‘secure’ borders, along with 
an increase in migrant figures, have been more 
lethal than ever. The International Organization 
for Migration counted 3770 dead or missing 
migrants in the Mediterranean in 2015, 
noting that that year “marked the sharpest 
increase in arrivals to Europe and deaths in the 
Mediterranean.”4 The toll in the first five months 
of 2016 already amounts to 2443 more deaths.5 
In general, these can be considered conservative 
estimates, as not all deaths are discovered and 
counted.
The EU’s response to this tragic death toll though 
is merely increasing border security and border 
control initiatives. There is little to no attention 
paid to the reasons people become refugees. 
By far the largest share of people arriving in the 
EU in 2015 came from the war-torn countries 
of Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, where European 
and broader western interventions and policies, 
including arms trade, have added to violence and 
chaos. Other drivers for migration are repression 
and human rights abuses, for example in Eritrea, 
another country many refugees to Europe 
originate from. In many countries women and 
LGBTQ+ people are targets for discrimination 
and violence. 
Poverty, hunger and economic inequality are 
also reasons for migration. Attempts by Western 
media to dismiss refugees as ‘economic migrants’ 
or ‘fortune seekers’ disregard the inhumane 
consequences of an unjust global economic 
system and the many ways people and planet 
are being exploited for the benefit of a few.
Apart from extreme-right politicians, who 
benefits from this war on immigration? As this 
report shows, one of the main beneficiaries of 
the EU response to the current refugee tragedy 
have been military and security companies. A 
significant part of border security purchases by 
EU member states, and neighbouring countries, 
is financed through EU funding. The EU and 
individual member states have spent billions of 
euros on border security during the last decade. 
The military and security industry is not only a 
beneficiary, it increasingly shapes European 
border policy by constantly lobbying on border 
security and control policies, and for more 
funding for research and purchases in this field. 
What has emerged is a European border security 
industrial complex where the interests of 
European securocrats and the profits of military 
companies are increasingly aligned.
This report also shows how cynical this 
profiteering is, because this industry profits from 
both sides of the tragedy: first, from fuelling 
conflicts and chaos that force people to flee, and 
then again from trying to stop these refugees 
from finding safety and a liveable future. 
Major European arms firms such as Airbus, 
Finmeccanica and Thales are some of the most 
prominent players in this theatre of inhumanity 
and violations of fundamental rights.
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The recent increase of refugees trying to enter 
Europe is not a phenomenon that came out of 
the blue. In the last decade the Middle East and 
North-Africa has been the theatre of expanding 
chaos, with war, violence, repression, human 
rights abuses and poverty becoming a reality for 
more and more people. The consequences of 
climate change also play an ever more important 
role in increasing the chaos and its drivers.6
While the causes and backgrounds of these 
crises are complex and widespread, one thing is 
clear: the easy availability of arms doesn’t help 
to prevent conflicts from further escalating. And 
there is no shortage of weapons in this region; 
rather it has been flooded with arms. Countries 
in the Middle East belong to the largest arms 
purchasers in the world. Next to the USA, the 
countries that make up the European Union are 
the most important suppliers of these arms.
Even with (partial) arms embargoes, installed by 
the UN and/or the EU, against Egypt, Iran, Libya, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria and Yemen 
and against non-governmental forces in Iraq 
and Lebanon, EU arms exports to the region 
have been very significant.7 In the decade from 
2005 to 2014, EU member states granted arms 
exports licences to the Middle East and North 
Africa worth over 82 billion euros (see table 1). 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
are the second and third largest recipients of 
arms from the EU.
TABLE 1 
VALUE OF ARMS EXPORT LICENSES TO  
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (2005-2014) 
IN € MILLIONS (COUNTRIES WITH  
>50 MILLION EUROS WORTH OF LICENSES)
Recipient Value (in millions of euros)
Afghanistan 1,343
Algeria 5,678
Bahrain 462
Egypt 2,865
Ethiopia 186
Iraq 1,352
Israel 2,195
Jordan 768
Kuwait 3,525
Lebanon 146
Libya 1,142
Morocco 4,102
Oman 7,437
Qatar 2,297
Saudi Arabia 25,844
Tunisia 255
Turkey 6,320
United Arab Emirates 16,122
Yemen 250
Total 82,289
Source: Official Journal of the European Union annual reports  
on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; Table:  
Stop Wapenhandel
FUELING THE REFUGEE 
TRAGEDY: EU ARMS EXPORTS
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Since 2008, there has been a large increase in 
EU arms exports to these countries. The use of 
such arms to crack down on popular uprisings 
during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 didn’t 
result in more restrained arms export policies. 
And indeed, despite the wars in Syria and Yemen, 
armed conflicts in Libya, Iraq and Turkey and 
severe human rights abuses in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, arms exports from EU member states 
to the Middle-East and North Africa continue. 
A decrease in exports in 2014 is mostly connected 
to (temporary) lower spending by Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE, mainly caused by falling oil prices 
and revenues.
According to the research institute SIPRI, global 
arms exports to the Middle-East increased by 
61 per cent between 2006-10 and 2011-15.8 
In 2015 Saudi Arabia was the world’s largest 
arms importer, with Egypt, the UAE, Iraq, Qatar, 
Algeria, Israel and Turkey also in the top 20.9 
Pieter Wezeman, Senior Researcher with SIPRI, 
predicted that “large deliveries of arms to the 
Middle East are scheduled to continue as part of 
contracts signed in the past five years.”10
GRAPH 1 
VALUE OF ARMS EXPORT LICENSES TO MIDDLE EAST  
AND NORTH AFRICA GRANTED BY EU-COUNTRIES
The quick rise of Daesh (also known as Islamic 
State) is also partly due to earlier arms exports 
to the Middle East. Research by Amnesty 
International showed that Daesh gets most of its 
weapons from capturing and illicitly buying from 
Iraqi stockpiles.11
In general, non-governmental forces may acquire 
weapons in ‘illegal’ ways, but usually these arms 
entered the scene initially through legal channels. 
Dispersion of weapons, especially small arms, 
after the end of conflicts is a returning problem. 
Another example is the spread of weapons from 
Libya, after the fall of Gadaffi, through illicit arms 
exports to conflict-torn countries such as Syria 
and Mali.12
Several countries in the Middle-East were involved 
in supplying arms to diverse parties in the Syrian 
war. Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the 
United Arab Emirates were all named as playing 
a role in these secretive arms flows. All are 
important customers of the EU arms industry. 
The same goes for those countries involved 
in the Yemen war. While there is a UN arms 
embargo against the non-governmental forces 
in this war, EU arms exports to most countries 
in the Saudi-led coalition (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar and the UAE) remain at 
high levels.
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Several large international arms companies cited 
instability in the Middle East to assure investors 
about future prospects for their business.13 
The arms companies are assisted by European 
governments, which actively promote European 
arms in the region and are very reluctant, to say 
the least, to impose stricter arms export policies. 
Official representatives of MENA-countries are 
still welcome guests at major European arms 
fairs for instance.
Anti-arms trade groups have been pushing for 
an embargo against Saudi Arabia in particular, 
citing UN statements on war crimes by the 
Saudi-led coalition in the Yemen war. In February 
In 2015 BAE Systems, the largest European 
arms company, obtained 21.8% of its revenues 
from sales to Saudi Arabia. Major sales included 
Typhoon aircraft - in use in the war in Yemen, 
Hawk training aircraft and the upgrading of 
tracked armoured personnel carriers. BAE is also 
competing for four combat vehicle programme 
contracts in the Middle East.15
Just like BAE Systems, the other three major 
European arms producers, Airbus, Finmeccanica 
and Thales, have offices in the Middle East and 
do good business there. Habib Fekih, President 
of Airbus Group Africa and Middle East, boasted 
of increasing military sales due to the conflicts 
in the region.16 Recently Airbus sold two air-to-
air refuelling aeroplanes to Qatar, four C295W 
patrol and transport aircraft to Saudi Arabia and 
24 military helicopters to Kuwait.17 
2016, the European Parliament voted in favour 
of such an embargo, but the Council of the EU, 
which decides in these matters, didn’t act.
EU member states continue to grant export 
licenses for arms transfers to Saudi Arabia and 
other countries in the MENA region. British Prime 
Minister David Cameron praised British arms 
companies that have done business with Saudi 
Arabia, just hours after the embargo vote in the 
European Parliament. He said he was proud 
of the “brilliant things” British arms giant BAE 
Systems had sold to the country and announced 
the British have “got more work to do in Saudi 
Arabia.”14
Finmeccanica was awarded a contract to 
upgrade six Royal Bahrain Naval Force ships.18 
It will also deliver 28 Eurofighter Typhoons, built 
by a consortium with Airbus and BAE Systems, 
to Kuwait as part of a deal worth over 9 billion 
dollars.19 Another large sale is that of Kronos 
radar to Qatar, which will be used to monitor its 
airspace.20
Some of the largest military contracts, worth 
over 100 million euros, for Thales in 2015 
concerned Middle Eastern countries. Egypt 
and Qatar purchased Rafale aircraft, while two 
other undisclosed countries ordered unnamed 
‘military equipment.’21
TABLE 2 
LARGEST EUROPEAN ARMS PRODUCING COMPANIES
Rank 
(2014)
Global 
rank
Company Country Arms sales as %  
of total sales
Revenues (2015) in euros Profit (2015) in euros
1 3 BAE Systems UK 94 21.2 billion 2.10 billion
2 7 Airbus Transeuropean 18 64 billion 4.09 billion
3 9 Finmeccanica Italy 54 13 billion 0.88 billion
4 12 Thales France 50 14.1 billion 1.22 billion
Sources: SIPRI, Top 100 arms producing companies in 2014, 2015; Annual reports 2015 of named companies
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EU RESPONSE TO MIGRATION: 
MILITARISING THE BORDERS
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EU Schengen States
Non-EU Schengen States
Non-Schengen EU States
Schengen candidate countries
While the role of the EU in fuelling chaos and conflict in the Middle-East and North 
Africa, not in the least by continuing arms exports, is undeniable, it fails to take 
proper responsibility for one of the tragic consequences of the resulting violence 
and instability. Instead, refugees, looking for a safe place to stay with the chance of 
building a future life, are framed as a threat to European security and prosperity. 
They run against the walls of ‘Fortress Europe’, and face ever more (military) means 
to keep them out or get them out.
This continuing securitisation and militarisation of the borders builds on long-standing EU policies. 
The foundations of the current EU border security policies were laid with the signing of the Schengen 
Agreement in June 1985 in the eponymous village in Luxembourg. It coupled the gradual opening 
of internal borders within the common territory of the participating states (since the launch of the 
supplemental Schengen Convention of 1990 known as the ‘Schengen Area’) with robust controls at the 
external borders of the area. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 incorporated the Schengen treaties and 
rules into European Union law, obliging the member states to follow them.
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Since then securing the external borders of the 
EU has become one of the cornerstones of its 
communal policies. Europe has subsequently 
witnessed an increase in surveillance and military 
patrols, particularly concerning migration routes 
to South Europe. Forcing migrants to choose 
ever more dangerous routes has turned the 
Mediterranean into a death trap. Most of the 
blame for this has been put on smugglers, but 
the escalating use of military means to stop 
migration is the main cause of migrant deaths. 
In another turn, the EU has been trying to 
cooperate with third countries to stop migrants 
on their way to Europe as early on their journey 
as possible, the so-called externalisation of the 
borders.
Both of these approaches are highly problematic 
and have been criticized by human rights 
institutions and organisations for their 
consequences, which apart from people dying 
on their journey include the violation of their 
rights, including the right to seek asylum. Their 
call for ‘safe routes’, through which refugees can 
reach Europe and exercise their rights, has fallen 
on deaf ears.
‘FIGHTING ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION’
The Hague Programme of 2005 set the agenda 
for the EU in the areas of ‘Justice, Freedom and 
Security’. It prioritised the “fight against all forms 
of illegal immigration”, naming several policy 
objectives that have remained building blocks 
of the EU’s migration policies. Those include 
“cooperation with third countries”, “integrated 
management of external borders”, “an integrated 
technological approach” and “improving 
exchange of information”.22
The darling child of these policies is EUROSUR, 
the overall European border surveillance ‘system 
of systems’, officially launched in December 
2013 after years of preparations.23 It provides an 
exchange of real time images and data between 
EU member states through a network of National 
Coordination Centers, coordinated by Frontex, 
the EU agency for the protection of the external 
borders. Based on this, “Frontex creates the 
European situational picture and the common 
pre-frontier intelligence picture (focused on areas 
beyond the Schengen Area and EU borders).”24 
The European Commission stated that EUROSUR 
is “a process which will never stop” and will 
always require improvements, thereby signaling 
to the military and security industry the promise 
of an ever ongoing demand for new ‘improved’ 
equipment.25
At its meeting in June 2014, the European Council 
concluded: “The Schengen area [...] and the 
increasing numbers of people travelling to the 
EU require efficient management of the EU’s 
common external borders to ensure strong 
protection. The Union must mobilise all the tools 
at its disposal to support the Member States in 
their task. ”
This alarmist language has been backed-up 
by military-style rhetoric, framing refugees as 
a security threat and calling for “a robust fight 
against irregular migration”.26 In 2015 and 2016 
the EU announced a long list of measures against 
‘illegal’ immigration, rapidly increasing the 
military tone of its responses.
EUNAVFOR MED
In one week in April 2015, two ships with migrants 
from Libya on their way to Europe capsized, 
resulting in the death of hundreds of their 
passengers. The EU responded by announcing 
the military operation ‘European Union Naval 
Force – Mediterranean Operation Sophia’ 
(EUNAVFOR MED), with the aim of undertaking 
“systematic efforts to identify, capture and 
dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used 
or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers 
or traffickers.”27 In other words, rather than focus 
on rescuing refugees, the focus was firmly put on 
militarily confronting smuggling networks.
The plan, with a EU budget of 11.82 million euros, 
consists of three phases. The first is “surveillance 
and assessment of human smuggling and 
trafficking networks in the Southern Central 
Mediterranean”. The second stage moves to “the 
search and, if necessary, diversion of suspicious 
vessels.” And the final phase “would allow the 
disposal of vessels and related assets, preferably 
before use, and to apprehend traffickers and 
smugglers.”28
Border wars |  12
This operation marked the first overtly militaristic 
reaction against refugees on EU level. The 
Operation Plan and Rules of Engagement for 
EUNAVFOR Med are not public.29 However, Steve 
Peers, Professor of EU Law at the University of 
Essex, noted on the basis of available documents: 
“The EU’s own military planners anticipate 
possible actions on the ground, and a high risk of 
loss of life of smugglers, military personnel and 
migrants.”30
EUNAVFOR MED has been criticised by human 
rights organizations as well as military experts. 
Judith Sunderland, acting deputy director of 
the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human 
Rights Watch, said: “[M]ilitary action could expose 
migrants and asylum seekers to serious risks. 
Saving lives at sea and bringing people at risk in 
the Mediterranean safely to EU shores should be 
the top priority.”31
Despite this, the EU moved forward. At the end 
of July 2015 the first phase of EUNAVFOR MED 
was fully operational, with four ships, two planes 
and three helicopters, provided by France, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK.32 
“After having achieved all the objectives of the 
first phase in terms of intelligence gathering, 
training and deployment”, the operation entered 
the second phase in October.33 In January 2016 
the EU said “68 boats have been removed from 
illegal organisations’ availability” as a result of 
the operation.34
In his report on the EUNAVFOR MED operation in 
2015, Operation Commander Enrico Credendino, 
of the Italian Navy, proposes supporting the 
capacity-building of the Libyan Coastguard, which 
should take over border control when the EU 
mission ends, “in exchange for their cooperation 
in tackling the irregular migration issue.”35
ARMED FORCES AT THE BORDERS
The militarisation of border security, through the 
use of military means and personnel, has been 
going on for years. From the start of the so called 
‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 many countries, especially 
at the southeastern border of the EU, began to 
deploy armed forces for border control. Today, 
the so-called ‘Balkan Route’, the most used way 
for migrants to West and North Europe, has been 
almost completely sealed off with thousands of 
people stuck in dire circumstances in Greece and 
Macedonia.
In May 2015, Bulgaria sent soldiers to its border 
with Macedonia, fearing internal turmoil in that 
country could lead to a wave of refugees.36 In 
August it again deployed 25 soldiers and light 
armoured vehicles to this border, to support 
border police, although joint patrols weren’t 
expected.37 In October an Afghan refugee was 
killed by Bulgarian border officers.38 Human 
Rights Watch documented dozens of other cases 
of police and military violence against migrants.39
Macedonian armed forces used tear gas and 
stun grenades to stop refugees from entering 
the country from Greece. Gauri van Gulik, 
Europe deputy director of Amnesty said: “[T]his 
kind of paramilitary response is an unacceptable 
pushback in violation of international law.”40
Hungary displayed a similar hard line by adopting 
a new law allowing the army to use rubber 
bullets, tear gas and net guns against migrants 
at its borders.41 Meanwhile, Serbia announced it 
could use its army to stop refugees being sent 
back from Hungary.42
In Slovenia, the government also called in the 
military and hired private security guards to 
join the border police in patrolling its border 
with Croatia. Boštjan Šefic, state secretary at the 
interior ministry, announced that fifty to sixty 
guards would assist the police at the border.43
Austria, Croatia, the Netherlands and the Czech 
Republic also deployed military personnel to 
assist with border security.44 Further down 
migration routes to Europe, Egyptian armed 
forces have a shoot to kill-policy against refugees 
trying to cross its border. Sudanese refugees 
were killed on at least two occasions in the 
autumn of 2015.45 Egyptian border guards also 
killed an eight-year-old Syrian girl, while firing on 
a boat with refugees leaving for Europe, following 
similar incidents in recent years.46
NATO ASSISTANCE
NATO patrol ships in the Mediterranean initially 
played a low key role in assisting Frontex border 
security missions,47 but have stepped up to a 
more active role.
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In February 2016, responding to a joint request by 
Germany, Greece and Turkey, NATO decided that 
its Standing Maritime Group number 2, already 
active in the region, would start conducting 
reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance 
in the Aegean Sea, directly coordinating with 
Frontex.48 One month later, five ships from 
various NATO member states expanded their 
patrolling mission into Turkish and Greek waters, 
sharing information with the Turkish and Greek 
Coast Guards and Frontex.49 NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg on one occasion 
claimed that “NATO ships are not in the Aegean 
Sea to stop or push back boats with migrants and 
refugees”, but also made it clear that “in case of 
rescue at sea of persons coming via Turkey, they 
will be taken back to Turkey.”50 Human rights 
organizations criticised this push back-policy, a 
clear violation of international law, which gives 
refugees the right to have their application for 
protection assessed in an EU member state.51
Meanwhile, NATO’s military commander in 
Europe, US General Philip Breedlove, made the 
unsupported claim that “Russia and the Assad 
regime are deliberately weaponising migration 
in an attempt to overwhelm European structures 
and break European resolve.”52
BORDER FENCES AND DRONES
Many EU countries now have fortified borders. 
Initially built between Bulgaria and Turkey and 
Greece and Turkey, and around the Spanish 
territories Ceuta and Mellila in North Africa, they 
have now expanded to the borders of Austria, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Macedonia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Ukraine.53 Steve Wright, Reader in 
the School of Social Sciences at Leeds Beckett and 
a long-time researcher on border technologies 
says that “the hi-tech border fences become 
political theatre, symbolizing that the authorities 
are tackling this critical problem”, warning that 
“the scope of activity will slowly creep beyond 
existing borders using surveillance and robotics 
to create more targeted early warning and 
deterrence capacities.”54
The military and security industry is sure to profit. 
A border fence is not just a fence. As Wright et 
al sum up: “The border-exclusion technologies 
deployed against unauthorised migrants include 
concrete walls, virtual walls, monitoring and 
sniper towers, cameras, land radars and wireless 
telecommunication infrared surveillance, 
carbon-dioxide probes, information technology, 
identif ication systems and immigration 
databases.”55
They warn about a future where (semi-)
autonomous systems are used to target migrants. 
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or 
drones) for surveillance is already on its way.56 
Border security authorities in the EU are certainly 
keen on this, but are currently restricted by 
complex sets of airspace regulations. In February 
2016, Finland announced it will test drones to 
monitor its border with Russia, following the 
growth of numbers of migrants trying to enter 
the EU after long journeys northwards through 
Russia.57 Also, by the end of this year the use 
of drones to monitor maritime borders by the 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) is 
foreseen. EMSA will outsource operations of 
the UAVs to a service provider, to be selected 
through a public tendering process.58
FROM FRONTEX TO A EUROPEAN BORDER 
AND COAST GUARD AGENCY
The EU agency for the protection of the external 
borders, Frontex, was established in 2004. Its 
main task is coordinating border security efforts 
of the EU member states and supporting them, 
sometimes through joint (naval) operations. In 
the aftermath of several large shipwrecking 
incidents, with hundreds of migrants dying, 
such operations, and increased border security 
measures in general, were presented as the 
means to prevent people from dying at sea.
However, Frontex Executive Director Fabrio 
Leggeri was more honest about the real goals, 
saying that focussing on rescuing refugees 
would only play into the hands of traffickers.59 
And similar arguments have been made by many 
European politicians. It blatantly contradicts 
the evidence provided by researchers and 
activists who have been saying for years that 
it’s exactly the increase of border controls and 
the militarization of border security, thereby 
denying refugees safe routes to reach Europe, 
that traffickers profit from. According to Hein 
de Haas, professor of migration studies at the 
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University of Amsterdam and former director of 
the International Migration Institute at Oxford 
University, “[l]ots of money goes into border 
controls, but this does not address the causes 
of migration. Instead, it helps two groups, the 
smugglers and the migration control industry, 
while the suffering and border deaths among 
migrants and refugees increase.”60 In other 
words, the consequences of this policy of failing 
to provide safe routes is not so much a deterrent 
as a death sentence for many desperate refugees.
For its operational work, Frontex was completely 
dependant on personnel and equipment 
provided by the member states. This was 
a problem, because member states were 
notoriously reluctant in pledging assets and in 
meeting their commitments.61 Although since 
September 2011 Frontex was allowed to buy or 
lease its own equipment, this never really got off 
the ground, save for some trials.62 In February 
2016, Leggeri even mooted the hiring of private 
firms for Frontex-supported border control work 
in Greece, given a shortage in personnel provided 
by member states.63
In the second half of 2015, the European 
Commission presented plans to replace Frontex 
with a more robust new institution, a European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency.64 The mandate 
of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
would differ from that of Frontex in adding some 
fundamental points, giving it more means of 
its own and more control over member states’ 
efforts:
• a supervisory role in assessing the border 
security capacities of member states, 
culminating in a binding decision to take 
measures to strengthen these;
• the possibility of direct interventions in a 
member state, even without the consent 
of this member state, by decision of the 
European Commission;
• a mandatory pooling of border guards, by 
establishing a rapid reserve pool, for which 
member states have to cede personnel;
• setting up its own technical equipment 
pool, by buying equipment itself or in 
co-ownership with a member state, and 
being able to claim means of transport and 
operating equipment bought by member 
states with money from the Internal  
Security Fund;
• direct participation in the management of 
research and innovation activities, including 
for the use of drones, more advanced 
surveillance technology and systems to 
exchange information (as also foreseen 
under the EUROSUR regulations);
• cooperating with the European Fisheries 
Control Agency and the European Maritime 
Safety Agency in providing multi-purpose 
services to national authorities;
• increased cooperation with third countries, 
including joint operations (including on 
the territory of third countries) and the 
deployment of liaison officers.
The proposal also clearly foresees the use 
of arms: “While performing their tasks and 
exercising their powers, members of the team 
shall be authorised to use force, including service 
weapons, ammunition and equipment.”65
TABLE 3 
BUDGET FRONTEX (IN MILLIONS OF EUROS)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
6.3 19.2 42 70.4 83.3 92.8
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
118.2 89.6 94 97.9 142.6 238.7
Total: 1095
The budget of Frontex was increased several 
times during 2015. The budget finally adopted 
for 2016 is even an astonishing 67% higher than 
that for 2015. According to the proposal for the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency, this 
will be the minimum budget for the new agency 
in the coming years. For 2017 an extra 31.5 
million euros have been requested, including 10 
million euros to purchase small and medium size 
operational equipment.
If the establishment of the European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency proceeds, this would 
mean a fundamental shift to an EU-controlled 
system of border security, with the possibility of 
bypassing the member states and forcing them 
to strengthen controls and purchase or upgrade 
equipment. It is not hard to predict that this will 
lead refugees to use increasingly dangerous 
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routes, strengthening the business case for 
traffickers. For the military and security industry, 
however it means the prospect of more orders 
from the agency itself and from member states. 
EXTERNALIZING EU BORDERS
A long-standing policy of the EU is trying to stop 
refugees before they reach Europe’s borders, 
known as the ‘externalization’ of its borders. 
For this the EU works together with third countries, 
notably in Africa, the Middle East and Eastern 
Europe, letting them play the role of border guard 
outposts. In October 2013, Catherine Ashton, 
then the EU’s high representative for foreign 
affairs and security policy, stated: “It is […] in the 
EU’s interest to help build the capacities of third 
States to control their own territory, manage 
flows of people and goods and address their 
respective security challenges.”66
However, according to the Red Cross “[f]rom 
a humanitarian perspective the effects of 
externalisation are worrying. On the ground level, 
the journey to the EU has become increasingly 
dangerous adding even further to migrants’ 
vulnerabilities. At policy level, the scarcity of legal 
ways to access the EU makes it more difficult for 
vulnerable migrants to reach the EU safely and 
exercise their legal rights.”67
The way the EU persuades third countries to take 
on their role as outposts has sometimes been 
perceived as a form of blackmail or bribery.68 A 
senior diplomat involved in negotiations between 
the EU and African governments on border 
security stated that most African governments 
“say it’s all about Europe externalising and 
outsourcing its own problems.”69
EU funding of border security programmes and 
purchases of equipment is part of this outsourcing 
process. The recently released EUROSUR 
Handbook, for example, includes strengthening 
third countries’ capacities through “programmes 
co-financed by EU and international funds” and 
“donating assets and technical assistance”, as 
well as “[t]raining for third-country authorities in 
border control activities”.70
Another way of supporting third countries’ 
border security capacities is through permissive 
application of arms export regulations. In summer 
2015, the Dutch government granted a 34 million 
euro export license to Thales Nederland for 
the delivery of radar and C3-systems to Egypt, 
to be used on corvettes imported from France, 
even though it admitted that grave human right 
violations take place in Egypt. One of the reasons 
given by the Dutch government for granting the 
export license to Thales is the role the Egyptian 
navy plays in stopping ‘illegal’ immigration to 
Europe.71
DEAL WITH TURKEY
A prominent recent example of the externalization 
of borders is the deal between the EU and 
Turkey. In November 2015, a Joint Action Plan 
was agreed aimed at cooperation on ‘migration 
management’. In short: the EU promised to give 
Turkey three billion euros to step up border 
security, re-admit refugees that entered the EU 
from Turkey and to shelter Syrian refugees.
Closer cooperation between Turkey and Frontex 
is part of the Joint Action Plan. Measures to be 
taken by Turkey include the strengthening of “the 
interception capacity of the Turkish Coast Guard, 
notably by upgrading its surveillance equipment, 
increasing its patrolling activity and search and 
rescue capacity, including through stepping 
up cooperation with EU Member States.” From 
its side, the EU promised to support Turkey in 
“reinforcing the Turkish Coast Guard patrolling 
and surveillance capacity as well as other relevant 
Turkish authorities”.72
In January 2016, Turkey’s Under-Secretariat 
for Defence Industries released a Request for 
Information (RFI) to integrate subsystems into a 
coast guard aircraft, a Beechcraft King Air 350ER, 
for maritime surveillance operations, including 
border security missions. No less than 25 
companies, including Finmeccanica, responded 
to this request.73 Earlier Turkey had announced it 
would build a border security system at its border 
with Syria. “We may have to spend hundreds of 
millions of dollars on this in the next few years”, 
an official stated.74
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Regarding the Joint Action Plan, European 
Commission Vice President Timmermans 
said that “[t]he only benchmark of course are 
the figures going down”, showing a complete 
disregard for the safety and wellbeing of 
refugees.75 In January 2016, he stated that 
he wasn’t satisfied with Turkey’s efforts: “The 
numbers are still way too high in Greece, 
between 2,000–3,000 people (arriving) every day. 
We cannot be satisfied at this stage”.76 A month 
later, Frontex Executive Director Leggeri also said 
that Turkey wasn’t doing enough and needed to 
install “more stringent border controls”.77
While the EU complained that Turkey should 
do more to stop migration, human rights 
organisations rang the alarm about its crackdown 
on refugees since the signing of the migration 
deal. Amnesty International noted a sharp 
increase in unlawful detention and deportation 
in and from Turkey and warned that the 
“[p]roposed cooperation between Turkey and EU 
member states to police the border and prevent 
irregular crossings is likely to result in more 
people risking their lives in attempts at longer 
and still more dangerous sea routes.”78
Refugees also reported increasing violence 
against them by the Turkish coast guard.79 Both 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty documented 
cases of violence against Syrian refugees, 
including shooting at them to keep them from 
entering Turkey.80 According to the Syrian 
Observatory for Human Rights, 16 refugees 
from Syria, including three children, were shot 
between December 2015 and March 2016 when 
they tried to cross the border into Turkey.81
In March 2016, the EU and Turkey stepped up their 
cooperation with an even more controversial 
agreement, focusing on “the return of all new 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers from 
Greece to Turkey.”82 The new deal, which also 
includes an extra three billion euros support for 
Turkey, was once again heavily criticised by the 
UN and by human rights organizations. Human 
Rights Watch called it a “new low”, that puts the 
“very principle of international protection for 
those fleeing war and persecution at stake”.83 
Amnesty reported mass forced returns of Syrian 
and Afghan refugees from Turkey, illegal under 
Turkish, EU and international law.84
Many aid organisations, including UNHCR, 
Doctors Without Borders and Oxfam, suspended 
their work in Greek refugee centres turned into 
prisons, refusing to become part of a deal they 
deem to be ‘unfair and inhumane’ and contrary 
to international law.85
Many experts also doubt the practicability of the 
measures agreed upon, saying it’s impossible 
to completely seal off the borders. In addition, 
tightening border control between Turkey and 
the rest of Europe may just lead to shifting 
migration routes, to for example Egypt and Libya, 
again forcing refugees to make more dangerous 
journeys.
SELLING MILITARIZATION AS  
A HUMANITARIAN EFFORT
The EU has shown a Janus face in selling the rapid 
militarisation of its borders: on the one hand 
emphasising the tough stance in sealing of its 
borders and on the other hand claiming it to be 
a humanitarian effort, in terms of strengthening 
search and rescue capacities.
Rejecting responsibility both for its contributing 
role in causing people to flee, by fuelling conflict 
and chaos, and for the consequences of its military 
response to migration, the EU has repeatedly 
tried to put all the blame for refugee deaths on 
traffickers. This has resulted in narrowing its 
response to ‘taking away the business model of 
smugglers’, with even more military means to 
try to accomplish this. This creates a downward 
spiral: the greater the controls and the more the 
repression, the greater the risks refugees are 
forced to take resulting in more deaths.86
In an analysis for the European Parliament (EP) 
even the Policy Department of its Directorate-
General for External Policies in March 2014 had 
to acknowledge that “it is unclear whether the 
militarisation of EU border management will 
actually save lives or create even more danger 
for migrants”, advising to “steer away from 
excessively militarised and security-centred 
approaches.”87 Sound advice, that seems to have 
been largely ignored.
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LOBBYING FOR BUSINESS
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The arms industry plays a significant role in formulating the foreign and security 
policy agenda of the EU. Researcher Frank Slijper (Stop Wapenhandel) noted already 
in 2004 that “[t]he arms industry is deeply rooted in Brussels’ decision-making circles. 
It is of concern that its ability to set the terms of debate and shape the direction 
of policy can only be expected to grow in the coming years”.88 Two years later 
researcher Ben Hayes of Statewatch concluded after investigating the EU Security 
research programme that on the EU-level “[s]pawned by the military-industrial 
complex, the security-industrial complex has developed as the traditional boundaries 
between external security (military) and internal security (security services) and law 
enforcement (policing) have eroded.”89
In a follow-up report, Hayes showed how 
Europe’s largest defence and IT giants were 
setting the agenda for security-based research 
in Europe and winning most of the contracts. 
According to Hayes, “the European Security 
Research Programme continues to be shaped 
by prominent transnational defence and 
security corporations”, leading to “the rapid 
development of a powerful new ‘interoperable’ 
European surveillance system that will be 
used for civilian, commercial, police, security 
and defence purposes alike.” Border security 
is an important pillar of this system. Hayes 
revealed the deep involvement of industry in for 
example the development of EUROSUR and of 
autonomous border control systems, also on a 
political and strategical level.90 The €20 million 
TALOS project, for example, sought to develop 
and field test “a mobile, modular, scalable, 
autonomous and adaptive system for protecting 
European borders” using both aerial and ground 
unmanned vehicles, supervised by a command 
and control centre”. According to the TALOS 
project contract, these specially adapted combat 
robots “will undertake the proper measures to 
stop the illegal action almost autonomously with 
supervision of border guard officers”.
In 2011 Malte Luehmann of Brussels NGO 
Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) warned 
that the “loose alliance between policy makers 
and industry has [...] contributed to a worrying 
expansion of the EU’s defence and security 
structures in terms of decision-making powers, 
staff and organisational capabilities, and to the 
overall militarisation of its foreign policy.” He also 
argued that “the privileged access of industry 
to European policy-making process through 
the security and defence community, and the 
almost complete absence of civil society 
representation raise serious issues about 
democracy in the EU.”91
Against this background it is not surprising, yet 
nevertheless hardly known among the wider 
public, that lobbying by the military and security 
industry has been highly influential in the shaping 
of the border and migration policies of the EU, 
especially the securitisation and militarisation of 
these.
As Danish researcher Martin Lemberg-Pedersen 
(Centre for Advanced Migration Studies at the 
University of Copenhagen) wrote: “PSCs [Private 
Security Companies] establish themselves 
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as experts on border security, and use this 
position to frame immigration to Europe as 
leading to evermore security threats in need 
of evermore advanced PSC products.”92 What 
he calls “the securitised transformation of 
Europe’s borderscapes” has clear consequences 
for refugees, who, looked upon as a threat, are 
increasingly denied access to asylum and face 
other violations of their rights as human beings.
LOBBY ORGANISATIONS
The most important and influential lobby 
organisations of the EU military and security 
industry are the European Organisation for 
Security (EOS), the Aerospace and Defence 
Industries Association of Europe (ASD; presided 
by Mauro Moretti, CEO of Finmeccanica) and the 
think-tank Friends of Europe, whose ‘Security 
Europe’-policy area has incorporated the former 
think-tank Security and Defence Agenda (SDA).
EOS has been the most active on the issue of 
border security. According to Lemberg-Pedersen 
it is a “comprehensive tool with which PSCs seek to 
influence the common European border politics 
so as to create a demand for their products.”93 In 
general, the industrial lobby in this field seems 
to focus more on surveillance, technology and 
information sharing rather than on the use of 
traditional military means.
EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY 
(EOS)
EOS is the lobby organisation of the European 
security industry. Its main objective is “the 
development of a harmonized European security 
market.”
Members: 3M, ASD, Airbus Defence & Space, 
Almaviva, Altran, Atos, CEA, Centric, Cobalt, 
Conceptivity, Corte, DCNS, Demokritos, Edisoft, 
Engineering Ingegneria Informatica, Eustema, 
Finmeccanica, Fraunhofer, Gilardoni, G4S, 
Guardtime, IABG, Indra, Informatica ECI, Kemea, 
Kromek, L3 Communications, Laurea University 
of Applied Sciences, Multix, Optosecurity, 
Posteitaliana, Rapiscan Systems, SAAB, Safran, 
Smiths Detection, STM, Thales, TNO, United 
Technologies Research Center, Visionware94
Chairman of the Board of Directors: Santiago 
Roura (Indra)
Vice-chairmen of the Board of Directors: Andrea 
Biraghi (Selex ES (Finmeccanica)) / Mark Miller 
(Conceptivity)
CEO: Luigi Rebuffi (former Thales)
EOS has identified ‘border security’ as one of the 
main areas of concern in the field of European 
security. It has two working groups on border 
control issues:
• The Working Group on Border Surveillance 
is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of Selex 
ES, an Italian electronics and information 
technology business focused on the 
defence and security sector, that is a part of 
Finmeccanica.95
• The Working Group on Smart Borders is co-
chaired by Olivier Touret of Morpho, a French 
company specialised in electronic security 
and identity solutions, part of Safran, and 
Yves Lagoude of Thales.96
The Working Group on Border Surveillance 
strives to “establish an industrial roadmap and 
plan investments so that the further deployment 
of EUROSUR and the others surveillance systems 
at European level can be better supported”. 
And, of course, it also wants more funding, for 
example “using the ISF [Internal Security Fund, 
see next chapter] also to support pilots and Pre 
Commercial Procurement (PCP)”. It claims to 
work together with the European Commission on 
a regular basis concerning EUROSUR, maritime 
security and other border surveillance issues.97
EOS has organised several meetings between 
industry and EU officials and politicians on 
border security and issued some papers with 
recommendations. Quite a few proposals of EOS 
during the last years have eventually, mostly in 
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a trickled-down version, been reflected in EU 
policy. The mutual influence between industry 
and EU bodies in developing policies forms 
one of the cornerstones of the border security 
industrial complex.
In September 2010 EOS proposed the creation 
of “an EU level Border Guards capability able of 
supporting MS interventions, providing resources 
in case of crisis with a capability for basin-wide 
monitoring, directly operated by Frontex and 
using, where appropriate, aerial visualization.”98 
That sounds a lot like the European Border and 
Coast Guard discussed above.
At the conference ‘A new partnership for 
European security’, organized by SDA and EOS in 
February 2011, Jean-Louis De Brouwer (Director 
for Migration and Borders, Directorate General 
for Home Affairs of the EU) already raised 
the idea that Frontex be charged with global 
procurement and equipping member states 
in the future.99 Earlier, EOS had proposed for 
Frontex to be “a relevant interlocutor for the 
supply industry sector.”100
While this approach has as yet not been completely 
adopted, the direction of it can be found back in 
the proposal for the new agency, that gives it 
the possibility to buy its own equipment and to 
interfere with which equipment member states 
purchase.
The same goes for another recommendation of 
EOS, from a paper of May 2010, that focuses on 
“interoperability and information sharing across 
countries and stakeholders of different sectors 
(defence, border control, customs, marine 
pollution, fisheries control, maritime safety and 
security, vessel traffic management, accident 
and disaster response, search and rescue as well 
as law enforcement) for an improved situational 
awareness within the EU and the Member States 
[…].”101
Similarly the proposal for regulation for a 
European Border and Coast Guard suggests the 
new agency should strengthen its cooperation 
with the European Fisheries Control Agency, the 
European Maritime Safety Agency and national 
authorities carrying out coast guard functions.102
EOS also continuously lobbied for the 
establishment of an “EU Internal Security Fund”, 
which was already foreseen in the EU Stockholm 
Programme and indeed was set up for the 
period 2014-2020 (see next chapter). They also 
proposed several other measures supporting or 
creating profit opportunities for industry support, 
including EU support for “the deployment of 
EU competitive solutions in a wider external 
approach for EU borders surveillance. ”103
In a letter to the European Council and European 
Commission, in November 2013, EOS blames 
a perceived lack of investments on EU level 
for “hamper[ing] Europeans’ ability to address 
crises and to develop responses to mounting 
security challenges”, including “irregular 
migration”. It concludes that “more should be 
done to increase the protection of our citizens 
and assets”, especially measures to improve 
“the competitiveness of the European Security 
Industry at global level” and more funding.104 
Furthermore, it wants the private sector to get 
access to maritime surveillance data gathered 
under the EU’s Common Information Sharing 
Environment (CISE).105
EOS puts a lot of emphasis on EUROSUR, and 
data sharing in general, with harmonisation 
between member states and expansion being 
core objectives to get more funding.106 The role 
in EUROSUR the industry envisions for itself was 
echoed by Cecilia Malmström, then European 
Commissioner for Home Affairs, during a 
roundtable organised by EOS in February 2011: 
“In EUROSUR the industry plays an important 
role. Its technical expertise is extremely valid to 
detect needed technologies. We still need more 
P-P [public-private]cooperation to better detail 
the systems.”107
MEP Christian Ehler (European’s People Party), 
a staunch supporter of the military and security 
industry, wanted to go even further, using ‘border 
control’ as the showcase to promote EU industry 
on a global level.108
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Thinktank SDA hosted roundtables on border 
security in 2006 (‘Borders & People: The liberty 
and security balance’) and 2010 (‘Fine-tuning EU 
border security’). Typically, speakers at these 
roundtables were (EU) officials rather than 
industry representatives.
In 2006 Jacques Vermorel, then Head of the 
Research Technology and Industrial Outreach 
Section of NATO, already predicted the 
occasional use of military forces for border 
security. Industry lobbyist and then MEP Karl 
von Wogau (European People’s Party) argued 
for increased funding for ‘integrated border 
management’ and asked for more industry 
input. Ilkka Laitinen, then Executive Director 
of Frontex, and Kristian Bartholin, of DG JUST 
of the European Commission, also promoted 
‘integrated border management’, with ‘common 
systems and procedures’ as the ultimate aim of 
EU border security policies.109
TABLE 4 
INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS IN EOS AND SDA ROUNDTABLES AND CONFERENCES*
EU bodies 
represented**
Member States 
Authorities 
represented
Airbus Avio Atos BAE 
Syst
Engineering Finmeccanica Fraunhofer G4S Indra SAAB Safran Siemens Smiths Thales TNO
SDA Roundtable 
‘Borders & 
People’ 
24 April 2006
EC, EDA, EUMS, 
Frontex, 1 MEP
Germany 
UK
X X X X X
SDA Roundtable 
‘Finetuning EU 
border security’ 
29 September 
2010
CoE, EC  
(3 Comm), 
EDA, EP
Belgium 
France 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
The Netherlands 
UK
X X X X
EOS High 
Level Security 
Roundtable 
9 February 2011
CoE, EC, EDA, 
Europol, 1 MEP
France 
Hungary 
Italy 
The Netherlands 
UK
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
EOS-SDA 
Conference 
‘New partnership 
for European 
Security’ 
10 February 
2011
CoE, ENISA, EC, 
EC-JRC, ECo, 
EDA, EP, EUMS, 
3 MEPs
Austria  
Belgium 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Poland 
Romania 
Sweden 
UK
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
EOS High 
Level Security 
Roundtable 
21 March 2012
CoE, EC  
(4 Comm), 
EDA, Europol, 
Frontex, 5 MEPs
France 
Germany 
UK
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
* See Annex 1 for full list of industrial participants
** CoE = Council of the EU, EC = European Commission, EC-JRC = EC Joint Research Centre, ECo = European Council, EDA = European Defence Agency, 
EP = European Parliament, EUMS = EU Military Staff, MEP = Member of European Parliament / Comm = European Commissioners
Companies also have their own lobbyists in 
Brussels. Although there are no specific figures 
available on their efforts on the topic of border 
security and border control, the EU Transparency 
Register gives some insight into the overall 
lobbying carried out by companies and lobby 
organisations. Participation in the register is 
not obligatory, although the main players in the 
border security field do participate. Over the 
last five years (see Annex 2), Airbus has spent at 
least 7.5 million euros on lobbying, Finmeccanica 
and Thales each have spent over 1 million euros, 
Indra almost 1.5 million euros and Safran over 2 
million euros. Lobby organisation ASD has spent 
about 3.5 million euros, while EOS has spent at 
least 1.2 million euros.
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FRONTEX AND INDUSTRY110
Frontex has a close connection with the military 
and security industry. While the lobby to influence 
or create new policies and funding is aimed at 
the decision makers in the EU bureaucracy (and 
national administrations), as exemplified by 
EOS, Frontex as an actor in the field is constantly 
contacted by industry representatives with all 
kinds of proposals, often suggesting a meeting 
to discuss them further. In recent years, a lot of 
these proposals focus on offering surveillance 
and/or detection equipment. UAVs are also 
promoted regularly, although Frontex recently 
said, mainly because of legal restrictions, that it 
doesn’t foresee their use in the near future for 
its operations. Prior to this, it had shown a keen 
interest in their possibilities for border security 
applications.111
In the last few years, Frontex has declined most 
requests for one-on-one meetings, referring 
companies to its biannual industry days or 
letting them know they would be contacted when 
Frontex identifies “any need in the scope of the 
products of your company”.
This general answer is also given in reply to 
proposals that should have been dismissed 
immediately. German company Wiesel Defence 
offered “non-lethal solutions” to deal with 
“problems with refugees on land and on water”. 
Bulgarian company Prono, fully owned by the 
Bulgarian state, went further and suggested 
the use of a “system for amplification of state 
border protection”, “recording and reporting 
attempts for illegal penetration across the state 
border.” Its offer scarily includes “manageable 
or automatic non-lethal impact and manageable 
lethal influence on offenders without requiring 
constant monitoring by qualified personnel”. 
The proposal also says that “if requested ammo 
with non-lethal effects could be replaced by 
ammunition with lethal effects”.
Frontex is asked regularly to be a partner in 
EU-funded R&T projects (see next chapter). It 
denies all those requests though, because it is 
sometimes “part in the evaluation committee 
as evaluators of the European funded project 
proposals”. Once a project is selected for funding, 
however, “Frontex could potentially participate 
[...] as advisor or as (representative of) end-
user(s).” Frontex indeed is frequently involved in 
R&T projects on border security.
While there is a close relationship between 
them, it becomes clear from email exchanges 
that Frontex isn’t always a willing plaything 
for industry. It is quite strict in adhering to 
procedures and deadlines. And it doesn’t seem 
eager to facilitate industry requests beyond the 
scopes it has decided upon.
In general Frontex and industry are in some kind 
of perpetual dance, sometimes with objectives 
going the same way, other times with a subtle 
battle on whose interests come first. It remains to 
be seen how relations between industry and the 
new European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
will evolve. With more opportunities to purchase 
its own equipment, and to urge member states 
to buy additional equipment, the agency is likely 
to become an even bigger target for lobbying 
and marketing than Frontex is now.
MEETINGS BETWEEN FRONTEX  
AND INDUSTRY
In March 2014 Frontex announced a new 
procedure for meetings with industry, 
concentrating those meetings into biannual 
industry days and ad hoc workshops on special 
subjects. In a mail to German company OHB 
System, a Frontex official explains that “due to 
the fact that we have an important number of 
requests for meetings from the industry’s side, 
we decided to group them in 2–3 yearly events, 
based on topics relevant for border control and 
the interest of our experts.”
Before this a lot of meetings were organised on a 
case-by-case basis, with company representatives 
visiting the Frontex headquarters in Warsaw. 
Since the start of the new procedure, the only 
company that was granted a separate meeting, 
as far as email traffic shows, was DCNS, which 
in 2015 was invited to present the results of the 
EU-funded FP7 I2C and PERSEUS border security 
R&T-projects.
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For the industry days, “selection of the submitted 
proposals […] take[s] place taking due account of 
the novelty and potential impact of the company’s 
products and services for the border guard 
community”. Both large companies and SMEs get 
invitations. Apart from Frontex representatives, 
“[e]xperts from the Member States Border Guard 
Authorities [are] also invited to take part.”112
In 2014 and 2015 at least seven coordinated 
meetings between Frontex and industry 
took place (see Annex 3 for an overview with 
participating companies). Important players 
in the border security market, such as Airbus, 
Finmeccanica, Indra, Safran and Thales, were 
regular participants.
For 2016 Frontex planned four workshops for 
industry and academia:
• “on a Frontex consultation on the potential 
for industry provision of ‘deployable support 
to external border crossing registration’”113;
• “on highly innovative/cutting edge 
technologies, applications, products for 
border security”114;
• “on projects/ideas for developing border 
security products/technologies/solutions”115;
• “on methodologies/methods, procedures, 
best practices on investigating/testing/
evaluating border security technologies”116
With such wide-ranging open invitations, Frontex 
essentially wants companies to showcase their 
products and services in a way that suggests 
border security has become very much a supply-
driven market.
SECURITY FAIRS AS MEETING POINTS
Denying a meeting request from Safran, a 
Frontex official noted that “ED [Executive 
Director Leggeri] visited the Safran Hall in Paris 
Le Bourget exhibition in 2015”, as requested 
by Safran earlier. Frontex presence at such 
events is quite common. In general, industry 
representatives, government officials and military 
and security personnel meet around the year at 
conferences, fairs and round tables. According to 
International Security Professor Nick Vaughan-
Williams (University of Warwick): “At these 
events it is possible to identify a cyclical culture 
whereby the presentation of new technologies 
not only responds to, but also enables and drives 
the formulation of new policies and practices 
in the field of border security and migration 
management.”117
In March 2016 the UK Government hosted 
the annual ‘Security and Policing’ event at 
Farnborough, a secretive fair aimed at law 
enforcement, police and security professionals. 
Airbus, BAE Systems and Finmeccanica were 
present as exhibitors. Attendees must be vetted 
by the UK Home Office, with the fair organisers 
claiming that “the event enables exhibitors to 
display products which would be too sensitive to 
show in a more open environment.”118
The British Government shows little restraint in its 
invitation policies. For this event it invited official 
delegations from dozens of countries, including 
many which are involved in war, conflicts and 
repression in the Middle-East: Bahrain, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE.119 According to Andrew Smith of the 
British Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT): “By 
continuing to arm and support dictatorships and 
human rights abusers, the UK government is only 
helping to fuel and facilitate this oppression.”120 
And thereby fuelling the refugee tragedy as 
well. Ironically, for the companies present at the 
fair that means just another profit opportunity. 
Many of them emphasised their ‘solutions’ for 
border security, with the fair providing a special 
arena for them to demonstrate their equipment 
in this field.121
Another important European fair, the Border 
Security Conference and Expo, had its ninth 
edition in Rome in February 2016. Speakers 
included Frontex Executive Director Fabrice 
Leggeri, several representatives of EU (member 
states’) border security authorities and some 
from the industry. The European Association for 
Biometrics organized a workshop on the use of 
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biometrics for border security as a side event.122 
Industrial attendees at the editions of 2014 and 
2015 included Airbus, Fraunhofer, Indra, Safran 
and Thales, as well as American arms giants 
Northrop Grumman and Rockwell Collins.123
In May 2016 the fourth edition of the Border 
Management & Technologies Summit took 
place in Ankara in Turkey. It focuses on security 
at the South-eastern European borders, with 
“government officials from Turkey, Hungary, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Georgia” present. Airbus is one of the sponsors 
of the summit, which also has an exhibition for 
officials to “network with key border security 
vendors”. 
In December the World Borderpol Congress takes 
places for the fifth time, in Athens, Greece. In its 
last gathering in December 2015 in The Hague (The 
Netherlands) the Congress described itself as “the 
only multi-jurisdictional transnational platform 
where the border protection, management and 
security industry policy-makers and practitioners 
convene annually to discuss the international 
challenges faced in protecting borders, received 
over 150 delegates from more than 47 countries 
for the most successful Congress to date.”124 The 
congress consists of both an exhibition and a 
conference, with speakers from border security 
authorities and security industry from all over 
the world.125
These special fairs and congresses on border 
security are relatively new; they all started within 
the last decade. In general, border security plays 
an increasingly important role in general military 
and security fairs and other meetings, providing 
a meeting place for an upcoming, developing 
and expanding market.
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EU FUNDING FOR  
BORDER SECURITY  
AND BORDER CONTROL
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The importance the EU attaches to control at its external borders is echoed in its 
funding of border security measures by both member states and third countries. 
Using several funding instruments, billions of euros are dispersed to buy equipment, 
services and training. EU-funded research and technology (R&T) programmes also 
spend substantial amounts of money on border security-related projects.
It is impossible to determine what the total EU, and individual member states’, 
financing for border security amounts to. Of a total planned six-year budget of 960 
billion euros for the EU from 2014 to 2020 the field ‘security and citizenship’, which 
includes border security, accounts for roughly 1.5%. What is clear, however, is that 
the budget for border security is increasing very rapidly, including extra funding 
announced on an ad hoc-basis.
FUNDING FOR (CANDIDATE)  
MEMBER STATES
Since 2004 the EU has financed a huge amount 
of projects from one or more member states, 
aimed at reinforcing border security and border 
control or other measures to stop irregular 
immigration. While far from being the only ways 
through which such funding takes place, there 
were three major funding instruments for these 
goals:
The Schengen Facility (total budget: 1.46 billion 
euros) was a temporary instrument (2004–2006) 
that funded border security measures in seven 
new EU member states with external borders, to 
make them comply with Schengen requirements. 
Such measures included purchasing operating 
equipment (patrol vehicles, IT systems, radio 
equipment). Border surveillance and IT systems 
accounted for 74% of total spending.126
Bulgaria and Romania had their own programmes 
from 2007 to 2009.127 For Bulgaria this included 
“the purchase of three helicopters, nine vessels 
and [...] the setting-up of an integrated system 
for the control and surveillance of the Black 
Sea border consisting of fixed and mobile 
observation posts equipped with radars, 
cameras and communication equipment.” 
Romania “purchased 33 vessels, 1278 vehicles 
and equipment for border surveillance and 
border checks”.128
The Schengen Facility for Croatia started in 2013 
and will run to July 2016. As of January 2016 
Croatia had used it to buy 240 vehicles, ten 
vessels and two helicopters as well as to upgrade 
its communication and IT system.129
The External Borders Fund (EBF; total budget: 
1.70 billion euros) ran from 2007 to 2013. It was 
aimed at working towards a “common integrated 
border management system”, with an emphasis 
on “development and implementation of the 
national components” of EUROSUR, and “tackling 
illegal immigration”.130
Member state ‘actions’ eligible for funding 
included those relating to “surveillance 
infrastructures at external borders and at border 
crossing points, surveillance equipment, means 
of transport, investments in state-of-the-art 
technology, personnel training and exchanges 
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and data-exchange equipment and systems.”131 
Non-member states Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland, which are part of the Schengen Area, 
also got funding from the EBF, while Ireland and 
the UK, which opted-out of Schengen, didn’t.
The Internal Security Fund – Borders and Visa 
(ISF; total budget: 1.32 billion euros) runs from 
2014 to 2020. Its objective concerning borders 
is “achieving a uniform and high level of control 
of the external borders by supporting integrated 
borders management, harmonising border 
management measures within the Union and 
sharing information among EU States, and 
between EU States and Frontex, in order to 
halt irregular migration and ensure the smooth 
crossing of the external borders.”132 ‘Actions’ 
up for funding include “setting up and running 
IT systems” and “acquisition of operational 
equipment”. Funding goes to the same countries 
as mentioned for the EBF.
Total EU funding for member state border 
security measures under these three instruments 
adds up to almost 4.5 billion euros from 2004 on:
TABLE 5 
EU FUNDING FOR BORDER SECURITY
Member State Schengen Facility133 EBF134 ISF-Borders135 Total (millions of euros)
Austria 13.9 12.2 26.1
Belgium 19.9 17.5 37.4
Bulgaria 129 38.1 40.4 207.5
Croatia 120 40 35.6 195.6
Cyprus 27.9 34.5 62.4
Czech Republic 15.9 14.4 30.3
Denmark 7.9 10.3 18.2
Estonia 77 27.1 21.8 125.9
Finland 51.3 36.9 88.2
France 116.2 85 201.2
Germany 76.1 51.8 127.9
Greece 207.8 166.8 374.6
Hungary 153.7 59.3 40.8 253.8
Iceland 0.4 5.3 5.7
Italy 250.2 156.3 406.5
Latvia 78.9 16.8 15.5 111.2
Lithuania 149.9 31.7 24.7 206.3
Luxembourg 0.6 5.4 6
Malta 1.1136 70.4 53.1 124.6
Norway 11.5 14.3 25.8
Poland 283.3 64.6 49.1 397
Portugal 23.9 18.9 42.8
Romania 301.2 59.5 61.2 421.9
Slovakia 53.5 8.7 10.1 72.3
Slovenia 113.9 49.5 30.7 194.1
Spain 289.4 195.4 484.8
Sweden 10.9 11.5 22.4
Switzerland 17.7 18.9 36.6
The Netherlands 38 30.6 68.6
Community / Specific 
Actions
56.1 106.7
Union actions and 
emergency assistance
50.6
Total 1461.5 1701.3 1319.6 4482.4
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Several candidate-EU member states also received 
funding for migration-related activities, under 
the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA (2007–2003) and IPA II (2014–2020). The 
total funding so far has been 604.9 million 
euros, with Turkey getting over three-quarters 
of this (469 million euros). Other recipients are 
Serbia (54 million euros), the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (24 million euros), Bosnia 
& Herzegovina (16.8 million euros), Montenegro 
(22.6 million euros), Albania (16.8 million euros) 
and Kosovo (1.7 million euros).137
As of yet there is no current overview of what 
the member states spend the EU-funding on. An 
‘Ex-post evaluation of the External Borders Fund 
for the period 2007–2010’ gives some indication 
of both spending and the importance of the Fund. 
According to this report, 13 member states stated 
they have “no alternative to the EBF as a funding 
source for their external border management ” 
and in general “many actions would have been 
impossible or less effective without the EBF.”
Spending on measures related to the surveillance 
of EU external borders constitutes 42% of the 
total spending of 546 million euros during these 
years. Equipment purchased or upgraded with 
EBF funding includes 545 border surveillance 
systems, 22,347 items of operating equipment 
for border surveillance and 212,881 items of 
operating equipment for border checks. Also 
purchased were 3,153 ‘means of transport, 
including “cars, mostly in Italy and Greece (2,629), 
motorcycles (172, of which 148 in Greece), 
boats (61), patrol vessels (43), helicopters (34) 
and aeroplanes (5). Norway used the EBF to 
modernise its entire fleet of snowmobiles (8), 
all-terrain vehicles (7) and trailers (3). Lithuania 
bought 100 bicycles and Romania 12 tractors for 
maintenance of the external border.”138
A more detailed look at border security sales of 
European military and security companies, in 
the next chapter, will show that especially Airbus 
and Finmeccanica are major profiteers from 
EU-funded purchases. Helicopters and border 
security (surveillance) systems make up the bulk 
of purchases.
Recently several EU member states have 
published their plans for ‘actions’ to be funded 
by the ISF. Those plans include purchasing 
transport means, surveillance equipment, UAVs, 
IT systems, other technological equipment 
(including for biometric checks) and spending 
on integrating in the EUROSUR network.139 The 
‘National Programme’ of Greece, for instance, 
mentions planned spending on integrated 
surveillance systems for land and maritime 
borders, modern technological equipments 
(mobile scan units, CCTV camera systems), UAVs, 
six Coastal Patrol Vessels and equipment for use 
in Frontex joint operations, including a ‘Thermal 
Vision Vehicle’.140
Belgium, as an example of a country not on 
the external borders of the EU, named “the 
development of EUROSUR and the upgrading 
and maintenance of modern technologies at the 
border” as some of the key issues in its plans for 
ISF-funded actions.141
FUNDING THIRD COUNTRIES’  
BORDER SECURITY
Connected to the externalization of the borders 
of the EU, the Commission also funds border 
security measures in third countries, notably in 
North Africa and Eastern Europe. There is a vast 
array of bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
support and cooperation programmes and 
projects providing the frameworks for these 
fundings. Funding either goes to those countries 
directly or to EU countries setting up programmes 
in third countries.
A prominent example is the funding, split 
between the EU and the Italian government, 
for a border security deal between Libya and 
Finmeccanica.142 Libya has been a hotspot for 
EU border externalisation programmes for 
years. In October 2009, Selex Sistemi Integrati, 
a subsidiary of Finmeccanica, announced a 300 
million euros contract with Libya for a large 
Border Security and Control System, including 
“the training of operators and maintenance 
staff as well as the completion of all the civil 
infrastructures required.” Finmeccanica called it 
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“one of the most important achievements by a 
Finmeccanica company in the Large Systems for 
Homeland Security domain.”143
The system had yet to be installed when Gadhafi 
was overthrown. In 2012, the new Libyan 
government resumed talks with Finmeccanica, 
but the project as originally planned didn’t 
seem to be an option.144 However, a year later 
Selex was contacted to supply a satellite-based 
surveillance system for monitoring the whole 
of Libya’s border.145 And in 2015 the original 
contract was resumed after all, only this time it 
focused on the northern instead of the southern 
border.146
In addition to this contract, in December 2010 
the European Commission decided to grant 
Libya 10 million euros to support the country 
in managing its borders and migration flows.147 
In 2013 the Council of the EU started EUBAM 
Libya, a “civilian mission under the Common 
Security and Defence Policy” to “support the 
Libyan authorities in improving and developing 
the security of the country’s borders”.148 The 
budget for EUBAM Libya was 56.5 million euros 
for its two-year run.149 A few months later, press 
reports challenging the ‘civil’ character of the 
mission appeared. They claimed the EU was 
training ‘paramilitary forces’, including Libya’s 
Border Guards and Naval Coast Guard (NCG), 
which both fall under the defence ministry.150 The 
mission ultimately became a failure, mainly due 
to the very unstable security situation in Libya.151 
In January 2016, however, Federica Mogherini, 
EU High Representative and Vice-President 
of the European Commission, stated that the 
EU was again ready to support Libya’s future 
Government of National Accord, prioritising the 
“focus on border management”.152
A few years ago migration to the Canary Islands 
came into the spotlight, as migrants tried to reach 
the EU in a dangerous journey there to avoid 
the Mediterranean. Mauritania was one of the 
starting points for these attempts. Between 2006 
and 2012 the EU through various instruments 
gave Mauritania over 16 million euros to counter 
irregular migration. This included funding for the 
construction and equipment of several border 
crossings and for the construction, renovation, 
equipment and training at the 45 priority border 
crossing points (both projects received 1.2 
million euros).153
The EU funds the six year (2012-2018) programme 
‘Integrated Border Management in Lebanon’, 
focused on technical assistance. It has a total 
budget of approximately 14 million euros.154 
As part of the programme, the EU donated 
equipment, mostly for document examination, 
to Lebanese border security authorities in 
the summer of 2014 and the fall of 2015.155 In 
November 2015, the EU also gave 23 million euros 
to Tunisia for security sector reform, including 
strengthening “the technical and operational 
capacities of land border security services.”
The ‘AENEAS Programme for financial and 
technical assistance to third countries in the 
area of migration and asylum’ ran from 2004 
to 2006 and had as one of its objectives “the 
establishment in the third countries concerned 
of an effective and preventive policy in the fight 
against illegal migration”. Under the complete 
programme, 107 projects were funded with a 
total of 120 million euros. These included a 1.1 
million euros grant to enhance border control in 
Mali, including the purchase of motorcycles and 
a car. Similarly 1.2 million euros were granted 
for strengthening border control in Niger, once 
again including the purchase of motorcycles. 
“Purchase of document control equipment for 
Border Guards” in Ukraine was part of a 800,000 
euros grant.
There was also a two million euros grant for 
‘Project Seahorse’ of the Spanish Guardia Civil, 
which included joint border control patrols with 
Moroccan services, and a follow-up grant of again 
two million euros to build a network between 
police forces of Spain, Morocco, Mauritania, 
Senegal and Cape Verde to coordinate the “fight 
against […] illegal immigration”.156
From 2007 to 2013 the EU had a ‘Thematic 
Programme of Cooperation with Third Countries 
in the Areas of Asylum and Migration’, as part 
of the Development Cooperation Instrument. 
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It was presented as a funding mechanism 
to support third countries in migration 
management, but with a clear final objective of 
“reducing the migratory pressure on the EU”.157
That is the deal with most of the support 
programmes that don’t exclusively focus on 
border security, border control and/or irregular 
immigration. Arguably their main aim comes 
down to keeping or getting migrants out of the EU 
(except those wanted for labour), be it through 
border enforcement, assistance for sheltering 
in third countries, readmission agreements, 
warning refugees against irregular migration to 
Europe or something else.
This makes it hard to say what some funding 
really is about and if it should be shared under 
‘externalisation of border security’. What the EU 
might call assistance for sheltering refugees might 
as well be regarded as a project to keep refugees 
outside EU borders, with dire consequences, as 
the example of the Ukraine shows. Trying to cut 
off the ‘eastern route’, Ukraine has been funded 
with 30 million euros to keep migrants from 
entering the EU. The Ukranian authorities used 
part of this money to build and renovate migrant 
detention centers. The Arup Group, a British 
engineering and technology company, and 
Eurasylum, a research and consulting firm (also 
from the UK), received 2.9 million euros to set up 
custody centres and Temporary Holding Facilities 
in Ukraine and for technical support. In December 
2010, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published 
a damning account of the way Ukraine treated 
refugees, concluding: “Not only has Ukraine 
been unable or unwilling to provide effective 
protection to refugees and asylum seekers, it 
has also subjected some migrants returned 
from neighboring EU countries to torture and 
other inhuman and degrading treatment.” HRW 
described the EU as an accomplice, pointing to 
“the money the EU has poured into re-enforcing 
Ukrainian border controls and boosting its 
capacity to apprehend, detain, and deport 
irregular migrants.”158 A 2015 report by German 
magazine Der Spiegel showed that the situation 
for migrants in Ukraine remained the same, with 
the EU refusing to comment.159
The examples described above by no means 
comprise a complete list of EU-funded projects 
for border security and border control in third 
countries. They merely give an impression 
of the way the EU pressurises neighbouring 
countries into playing their part in securing and 
heightening the walls of Fortress Europe. And, 
once again, part of the measures funded provide 
profit opportunities for the military and security 
industry.
EU RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY FUNDING160
Through various funding programmes the 
EU financially supports research & technology 
(R&T)-projects by industry and institutions. The 
so-called Framework Programmes (FP) are the 
most well-known. Up until the now running 
Horizon 2020 (FP8) military research is excluded 
from these funding, but if the European 
Commission gets its way this will change with 
the next programme, starting in 2021 with 
preparations already on their way.161 For now, 
military companies have already found their 
niche in security-related research.
According to researcher Ben Hayes “[t]he story 
of the EU Security Research Programme is one 
of ‘Big Brother’ meets market fundamentalism.” 
The basis was laid by a so-called ‘Group of 
Personalities’ (GoP) comprised of EU officials and 
eight of Europe’s biggest arms and IT companies 
(including Airbus (then EADS), BAE Systems, 
Finmeccanica, Indra and Thales).162
Border security and border control are focal 
points in the research programmes, with many 
projects explicitly aimed at strengthening 
EUROSUR. Since 2002, through Framework 
Programmes 6 and 7, Horizon 2020, the 
Preparatory Action for Security Research (PASR), 
the GMES-Programme (satellite observation) 
and the European Space Agency (ESA), the EU 
has funded 56 projects in the field of border 
security and border control with over 316 million 
euros, roughly 4% of the total budget of these 
programmes.163 The fifteen largest corporate or 
institutional profiteers account for at least 94 
million euros, coordinating 32 of the projects.
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TABLE 6 
MAJOR INDUSTRY BENEFICIARIES OF EU-FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS164
Company Country Number of projects165 Coordinated projects EU funding166
1 Airbus pan-European 12 2 €9,784,181
2 Totalforsvarets Forskningsinstitut Sweden 10 1 €8,455,875
3 Indra Sistemas Spain 7 2 €8,106,544
4 Isdefe Spain 6 0 €8,055,257
5 Thales France 18 5 €6,966,736
6 CEA France 7 3 €6,865,132
7 Fraunhofer Germany 16 1 €6,748,745
8 Finmeccanica Italy 15 3 €6,744,657
9 TNO The Netherlands 12 2 €6,691,312
10 Safran France 8 4 €5,638,931
11 Finmeccanica - Thales Italy - France 8 5 €4,795,540
12 Austrian Institute of Technology Austria 4 2 €4,577,486
13 BMT Group UK 3 2 €4,495,685
14 Smiths Detection UK 4 0 €3,524,815
15 DCNS France 2 1 €3,509,592
Source: cordis.europa.eu
Not surprisingly, those companies prominent in 
EOS, which heavily lobbied for the establishment 
of EU R&T-funding for security (Airbus, 
Finmeccanica, Indra, Safran, Thales), turned out 
to be among its largest profiteers. Other regular 
participants are several (semi governmental) 
research agencies:
Totalforsvarets Forskningsinstitut (FOI), the 
Swedish Defence Research Agency;
CEA, Commissariat à l’énergie atomique et aux 
énergies alternatives (Alternative Energies and 
Atomic Energy Commission) is a French research 
organization;
TNO, the Netherlands Organisation for Applied 
Scientific Research. It also developed a research 
programme on border control with the Dutch 
border control authority Royal Marechaussee, 
a part of the military.167 Its product included the 
@MIGO-system “that reads the licence plates 
of [...]cars [passing the border] using laser-
activated cameras”.168 The system was criticised 
for violation of privacy laws.169 TNO supports 
EASP Air, another Dutch company, in preparing 
maritime surveillance  missions for Frontex 
through the use of the ‘SURPASS’ (surface picture 
assessment)-tool170;
AIT, the Austrian Institute of Technology, which 
is co-owned by the Austrian government and the 
Federation of Austrian Industries171. Together 
with ATOS and Gunnebo it also worked on the 
‘Future Border Concept’-project, aimed at the 
development of an automated border control 
system for the airport of Vienna.172 In 2015 AIT 
was co-organiser of an international workshop 
on Identification and Surveillance for Border 
Control (ISBC).173
In the Work Programmes 2014-2015 and 2016-
2017 for Horizon 2020 another estimated 60 
to 77 million euros is announced for several 
new border security-related projects (see 
annex 5 for an overview). These focus on more 
advanced surveillance technologies (including 
‘autonomous systems’) and contributions to so-
called ‘Smart borders’, speeding up processes for 
EU citizens and other wanted travellers, enabling 
border control authorities “to dedicate more 
time and resources to identify those who may 
pose a threat.”174
At the end of November 2014, several ongoing 
EU-funded security R&T projects gathered on 
Crete, for the ‘European Symposium on Border 
Surveillance and SaR operations technology’, 
organised by the Greek government. Airbus and 
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Thales were among the so-called ‘Friends of the 
Symposium’.175 Delivering the keynote speech at 
the symposium, Georgios Vourekas (head of the 
Sea Border Sector of Frontex) named “industry 
driven solutions” as one of the directions to go.176
Apart from the Framework Programmes, the 
European Commission funded two studies by 
Unisys Belgium. The first one, done in 2006, 
describes the legal possibilities of giving (limited) 
executive powers, including the right to use 
surveillance equipment and the right to carry 
service weapons, to border guards of one EU 
country to operate in other member states of 
the EU. It concluded that, while member states 
themselves were quite happy organising this 
on a bilateral basis, a common procedure was 
possible, and a larger coordinating role for 
Frontex was needed.177
The second study, “on the feasibility of the 
creation of a European system of border guards 
to control the external borders of the Union”, 
earned Unisys 289,358 euros.178 The study, which 
was published in October 2014, sketched three 
possible models for the future of EU border 
security. All models had some degree of deeper 
EU cooperation, based on “the idea of further 
integration and shared responsibility” in the field 
of border security. The final aim would be that 
“external border control becomes a competence 
of the EU” instead of of Member States. Taking 
a less gradual approach than Unisys proposed, 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
fits perfectly into this model. Co-ownership of 
equipment between Frontex and member states 
is one of the ideas in the study that is also part of 
the proposal for the new Agency.179
FRONTEX FUNDING FOR RESEARCH
Frontex itself funded some smaller research 
and demonstration projects. At the moment 
of writing, one such study, “on the set-up and 
management of border security-related research 
in and outside Europe”, is about to be awarded. 
It is aimed at improving (the outcomes of) 
EU-funded research.180
Edgar Beugels, Director of Research and 
Development at Frontex, explained the role of 
Frontex in R&T as a lubricant: “We do not do any 
research ourselves. We rely on research done by 
others […], we try to find out what they are doing 
and pass this to our end users (national border 
authorities and the Commission). Meanwhile, we 
collect a wish list from end users and transfer 
that back to the research community.”181
TABLE 7 
STUDIES FUNDED BY FRONTEX
Year Description Company Value
2012 Study of risk analysis models or similar instruments in use in EU and Schengen 
associated countries by border guard services182
RAND Europe (UK) €48,745
2012 Study on MALE UAVs and their potential use in border surveillance183 Isdefe (Spain) €74,999
2013 Study on methods and guidelines to assess operational capabilities, in services 
countering identity and document fraud and assessing risk at the first line of 
border checks184
RAND Europe (UK) €54,669
2014 Study on advanced technological integration for solutions for under-foliage 
detection and their potential impact on border surveillance185
Isdefe (Spain) €75,000
2014 Study on deployable technology for land border surveillance186 Isdefe (Spain) €59,400
2015 Concept development study for risk-based facilitated border check process187 Proodos (The Netherlands) €25,000
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Frontex also paid companies for field 
demonstrations. Lockheed Martin, FAST Protect 
AG, L-3 Communications, FLIR Systems, SCOTTY 
Group Austria, Diamond Airborne Sensing and 
Inmarsat were paid 30,000 euros to show their 
drones in Greece in October 2011. Thirteen 
companies (Israel Aerospace Industries, Lockheed 
Martin, FAST Protect AG, L-3 Communications, 
FLIR Systems, SCOTTY Group Austria, Diamond 
Airborne Sensing, Inmarsat, Thales, AeroVision, 
AeroVironment, Altus, BlueBird) demonstrated 
technological solutions for maritime surveillance, 
winning reimbursements ranging from 10,000 
euros to 198,000 euros.188
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SECURITY 
RESEARCH
EU funding for security research, (which could 
soon also include outright military research), is 
one of the success stories of the military and 
security industry, its allies and their common 
powerful lobby. Border security and border 
control-related projects became a central focus 
of the funding programmes, mirroring both the 
increasing importance the EU attaches to these 
policy areas and the interconnected importance 
the industry places on this. Security research 
has become the cornerstone of the military-
security-industrial complex, providing direct 
opportunities to profit but also helping drive an 
agenda that continually seeks to expand border 
security, providing the promise of ever more 
profits in the future.
For the industry, though, this is not enough. In 
February 2016 a so-called Group of Personalities 
issued a report on ‘European defence research’. 
The group, initiated by the European Commission, 
had more than half of its representatives 
coming from military companies (Indra, MBDA, 
Saab, TNO, Airbus, BAE Systems, Finmeccanica, 
F r a u e n h o f e r  a n d  L i e b h e r r - A e r o s p a c e 
Lindenberg). They recommended setting up a 
European Defence Research Programme as part 
of the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework 
(2021-27), with a budget of at least 3.5 billion 
euros and an industry-dominated Advisory 
Board, which also has to play “an active part in 
the definition of a long-term European military 
capabilities blueprint”, with “direct access to the 
highest level of the EU institutions.”189
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WHICH COMPANIES PROFIT 
FROM BORDER SECURITY?
In examining who benefits from the growing border security market, the same 
companies pop up again and again, both as the largest receivers of EU R&T funding 
and as major players in the influential lobby on EU border security. Moreover, what 
stands out is that many of these companies are also important suppliers of arms to 
the Middle East and North Africa.
GLOBAL BORDER SECURITY MARKET
After the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the end 
of the Cold War, the military industry struggled 
with decreasing defence budgets, especially 
in western nations, although the downward 
trend reversed in the late 1990s. Since 2008, the 
increasing tensions between Russia and the EU/
NATO, increased military spending in the Middle-
East, Latin America and Asia, and a larger military 
role of China in the international theatre, all 
helped push global military spending up to and 
above Cold War levels.190
In the intervening years, however, the military 
industry sought to compensate for the decrease 
in arms sales by trying to enter other markets. The 
most important of those has been the security 
market, which saw an enormous boost, and a 
gradual militarisation, especially after the attacks 
in New York and Washington DC in September 
2011. The subsequent and still ongoing ‘War 
on Terror’ has been a goldmine for military and 
security companies, which have become more 
and more intertwined. All major arms companies 
have set up or expanded security divisions.191
The rise of the border security market is closely 
connected to these developments. Framing 
migration as a security threat, sometimes 
arousing a caricatural fear of terrorist invaders, 
opened the door for all kinds of security 
products. Corporations have been eager to 
talk governments and politicians into believing 
they ‘need’ the products and services on offer 
to counter the imagined ‘threat’ of (irregular) 
migration. And government representatives 
have been happy to buy the arguments and the 
products. Illka Laitinen, former executive director 
of Frontex, said in 2013: “Our experience with the 
co-operation with industry is very positive - they 
have a lot of good ideas and they brought many 
new innovations.”192 193
The ‘products’ consist partly of ‘traditional’ 
military goods (for instance vehicles and 
helicopters), but more and more of ‘new’ 
technologies, drones, surveillance tools, 
biometrics, information technology and physical 
barriers (fences and walls). Apart from the 
major arms producers, which have incorporated 
border security technologies into their core 
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business, there are thousands of smaller (new) 
companies specialising in this segment. Western 
firms, especially from North America and Europe, 
dominate the market as they do in the general 
arms and security market.
The size of the border security market is difficult 
to determine, since it is not all that transparent 
and it is not always clear whether certain products 
will be used for border security purposes. 
Consultancy company Visiongain estimated the 
global market at some 15 billion euros in 2015, 
while Frost and Sullivan in early 2014 predicted 
the revenues would grow to over 29 billion euros 
in 2022.194
Major, and often controversial, deals in the border 
security field include the Finmecannica-deal with 
Libya, as well as the US Secure Borders Initiative. 
This initiative included a billion-dollar contract 
with Boeing, to build a border security network 
along the northern and southern borders of the 
United States. The project was plagued by severe 
(technological and legal) problems and was finally 
cancelled. It was partially replaced by a smaller 
project ($145 million), for which Israeli arms 
producer Elbit built a network of surveillance 
towers on the border between Mexico and 
Arizona.195 As in Europe, the militarisation of 
the US border with Mexico has been criticised 
by human rights organisations because of its 
negative impacts on refugees rights and the way 
it forces refugees to use more dangerous routes 
to avoid border enforcement.
Airbus got a contract for another important 
project: the development of a complete border 
security system for Saudi Arabia. Under this 
contract, worth around 2 billion euros, the 
German police worked together with Airbus 
employees in training Saudi border police in using 
the system. Dozens of German police officers 
were deployed in Saudi Arabia for this, with 
controversy caused by the fact they were paid 
from Germany’s international development aid 
budget.196 Moreover, the deal has been dogged 
with allegations of corruption and bribery.197
FRONTEX CONTRACTS
Most of Frontex’s budget is spent on grants 
to reimburse and support member states. As 
mentioned earlier, Frontex in 2011 got the right to 
buy its own equipment. This never really passed 
the stage of trials. It did some pilot projects in the 
field of aerial surveillance, but those generally 
weren’t successful, with one being cancelled 
when Greek authorities didn’t give a flight license 
to the company awarded the contract, Scotty 
Group from Austria. Another, for surveillance 
of the land border between Greece and Turkey, 
never even started, with the procedure being 
aborted because there were no suitable tenders 
offered.198
TABLE 8 
CONTRACTS WORTH MORE THAN 100,000 EUROS AWARDED BY FRONTEX  
(BORDER SECURITY/BORDER CONTROL)
Year Description Company Value
2013
Aerial border surveillance trial of manned aircraft with 
optionally piloted aircraft capability equipped with  
multi-intelligence sensors (cancelled)199
Scotty Group (Austria) €118,300
Purchase of annotated satellite imagery200 GAF (Germany) €224,700
2014
Framework contract for maintenance and evolution  
of the Eurosur network201
GMV Aerospace and Defence (Spain) €12,000,000
Pilot project on purchasing of aerial surveillance service for 
Frontex coordinated operational activities 2014 - provision  
of technical equipment and staff to perform aerial surveillance 
at the south-eastern external EU land border202
Diamond-Executive Aviation (UK) €270,000
Frontex positioning system (FPS) concept to create a single, 
integrated, real-time automated system for tracking assets 
deployed in the joint operations (JOs)203
Atos (Spain) €578,378
2015
Framework contract for aerial surveillance services assets  
and expert support204
CAE Aviation (Luxembourg) 
Diamond Executive Aviation (UK) 
Défense Conseil International (France) 
EASP Air (The Netherlands) 
Vigilance (The Netherlands) 
Indra Sistemas (Spain) 
SIA ‘Meža īpašnieku konsultatīvais centrs’ (Latvia)
€10,000,000
Procurement of a nautical chart Web map service that  
can be integrated into Frontex applications205
Carmenta (Sweden) €112,795
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Frontex doesn’t use an open tender procedure 
for most ‘low value contracts’, not exceeding 
135,000 euros. Usually these are advertised only 
on the Frontex website and concluded through 
a negotiated procedure with at least three to 
five candidates.206 From 2010 to 2015 eleven of 
such contracts in the field of border security and 
control have been awarded (see Annex 6 for an 
overview). Atos and GMV Aerospace and Defence 
are among the awarded companies.
MAJOR PROFITING COMPANIES
There is no complete overview of companies 
supplying equipment and services for border 
security. Research shows that those European 
companies most active in lobbying on EU border 
security policies are also some of the biggest 
beneficiaries of spending connected to those 
policies. The key companies profiting from 
border security includes Airbus, Finmeccanica 
and Thales, which, as we’ve seen, also are 
providing arms to the Middle East and North 
Africa that contribute to fuel the conflicts and 
chaos in the region, one of the major causes of 
recent migration flows. Other important players 
are Indra and Safran, also top receivers of EU 
funding for border security R&T.
AIRBUS
Robert Havas, Vice President of Security Business 
Development at Airbus, wrote in 2008: “With the 
growth of the European Union by gaining new 
member states, border security is a huge area for 
R&D developments and a promising market.”207 
Airbus is indeed one of the major recipients of 
EU funding for R&T (Table 6) and also profits 
from border security purchases new EU member 
states have to do to comply with Schengen 
requirements. Annual revenues earned for 
border security are around 200 million euros.208
Airbus’ products in the field of border security 
range from helicopters to communication 
systems to radar. In 2004, Romania awarded the 
company a contract for a complete ‘Integrated 
System for Border Security’ for monitoring, 
securing and communicating.209 The system 
had everything to do with EU border security 
requirements, as Romania had to meet these 
before becoming an EU member in 2007. This 
deal, worth 734 million euros, prompted a 
corruption investigation after allegations of 
bribes paid to Romanian officials surfaced.210
Signalis, a joint venture of Airbus and Atlas 
Elektronik (Germany), was also responsible 
for the Spationav program for French coastal 
border surveillance. The project integrates the 
coastal surveillance systems of the French Navy, 
Maritime Affairs, and Customs. Data collected 
through radar from several sources is combined 
into a common operational picture.211 Signalis 
sold a similar system to Bulgaria, once again 
because of Schengen obligations connected to 
becoming an EU member.212 The Spanish Guardia 
Civil is another customer, focusing on irregular 
migration to the Canaries and Baleares islands 
and Gibraltar.213
Airbus helicopters are used by several European 
border security authorities (see map 2). The 
Airborne Unit of the German Federal Police, the 
former Federal Border Guard, operates 79 Airbus 
helicopters. While the border patrol activities 
at the German borders have diminished, with 
Germany no longer bordering Non-Schengen 
Area countries, they are still used for border 
security over the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, 
and for Frontex missions.214
The border guard of Belarus also has four 
Airbus helicopters in use.215 Four pilots from 
the authoritarian-ruled state, widely criticised 
for its human rights violations, got a training 
in flying the Eurocopter (the former name 
of Airbus Helicopters) at a training centre in 
France.216 Bulgarian Navy pilots were trained in 
France as well, to operate three helicopters for 
border control missions, delivered in 2011.217 
The Bulgarian Border Police earlier purchased a 
TETRA communications network and thousands 
of radios from Airbus.218 Airbus also supplied 
radar for an Offshore Patrol Vessel for the Finnish 
Border Guard.219
Together with Israel Aerospace Industries, Airbus 
developed and markets the ‘Harfang’ UAV, which 
it promotes for border surveillance.220 Criticised 
for promoting a drone, ‘tested’ by Israel in Gaza, 
for tracking refugees, Airbus stated that what 
“technology partners choose to do with their 
own developments in their own countries, […] is 
their own business.”221
In 2013 Airbus co-hosted an International 
Border Security Workshop in Finland, together 
with Frontex, the US National Center for Border 
Security and Immigration and the Finnish Laurea 
University.222
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BORDER SECURITY HELICOPTERS: AIRBUS AND FINMECCANICA
Airbus: Bulgaria, Finland (EU-funded), Germany, Lithuania, Romania (EU-funded), Slovenia
Finmeccanica: Bulgaria (EU-funded), Croatia (EU-funded), Cyprus (EU-funded), Estonia (EU-funded), 
Finland, Italia (EU-funded), Latvia (EU-funded), Libya, Malta (EU-funded), Mauritania, Slovenia]
Airbus Finmeccanica EU-funded
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FINMECCANICA
Already in 2009 Finmeccanica identified “border 
control and security systems” as one of the 
primary drivers for increase in orders and 
revenues.223 This was followed, in the same 
year, by the already discussed deal with Libya, 
which was partly funded by the EU. In general, 
Finmeccanica and its subsidiaries supply a 
broad range of equipment for border security 
and border control applications, in the fields of 
surveillance, detection, (biometric-based) access 
control, perimeter security, communications and 
command and control systems.224
Helicopters from Finmeccanica’s AgustaWestland-
division are used by many EU-member states 
and neighbouring countries. Purchases are often 
(partly) funded by the EU (see map). In 2007 
Roland Peets, director general of the Estonian 
Border Guard, called the procurement of three 
AW139 helicopters “one of the biggest projects 
to have been accomplished utilising Schengen 
Facility funds”.225
Some deals were dogged by problems. In 2009 
a deal for 15 A-109 helicopters for the Algerian 
Border Patrol was finalised.226 This contract is 
one of those being examined by Italy’s tax police 
in a broader anti-corruption investigation.227 And 
in June 2015 Bulgarian press reported that all 
three AW-helicopters of the Bulgarian Border 
Police had been grounded since December 2014 
because of lack of aviation insurance.228
In 2005 Poland awarded Selex a 30 million euros 
contract for building a coastal surveillance system 
(ZSRN) for the Polish Border Guard.229 Selex also 
installed radar on maritime patrol aircraft of the 
Finnish Border Guard.230
In December 2015, Selex presented surveillance 
technologies, which were chosen by NATO for its 
Alliance Ground Surveillance Program, which has 
assistance in border control as one of its main 
aims. The system should start operating in Italy in 
2017.231 Finmeccanica and its subsidiaries are also 
very active in EU-funded R&T. Selex coordinated 
the SEABILLA project, aimed at the development 
of European Sea Border Surveillance systems.232 
In December 2014, Selex announced that it “will 
contribute its technology to the CLOSEYE […] 
project for Mediterranean surveillance. This 
monitoring system was conceived in response 
to the increasing pressure of migration from 
the North-African coasts to improve the border 
surveillance capabilities of the responsible 
authorities.”233
During the writing of this report, Finmeccanica 
renamed itself Leonardo, possibly in an attempt 
to improve its reputation after a number of 
corruption scandals.
THALES
Thales claims that it has delivered “[m]ore than 
50 turnkey systems or subsystems in service 
worldwide related to homeland security and 
border surveillance (Latvia, France, Estonia, 
...)”.234 Thales’ business report in 2011 mentioned 
a strong growth in revenues from the border 
protection business.
Thales has deployed a complete, integrated 
system for border security at the Eastern 
Latvian border, combining command and 
control software with optronics, sensors and 
a communication network.235 In 2015 it won 
a contract to supply the Spanish Guardia Civil 
with two mobile thermal units integrated into 
4x4 vehicles for border surveillance. Earlier it 
delivered “fixed surveillance thermal optronic 
systems” for the same purposes.236
In November 2015, several media outlets 
reported rumours that Thales is building a 
wall on the border with Libya for the Tunisian 
government, though the company declined 
to comment. Tunisia has covered the first five 
million dollars for the project, but would be 
trying to get funding from EU countries for the 
next steps of the project.237
In 2014 the dictatorial government of 
Turkmenistan issued a tender for a satellite-based 
monitoring system for its whole border with 
Afghanistan. Thales was one of the companies 
that responded, but it wasn’t disclosed which 
company won the contract.238 
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Thales works with Aerovisión, a Spanish company, 
on the international marketing of its Fulmar 
UAV, operated for border surveillance in the 
Malacca Straits, and on developing applications 
for it.239 In January 2012 they gave a real flight 
demonstration of the Fulmar for Frontex.240
Thales’ radar is installed on many ships around 
the world, some of which no doubt are used for 
border patrols. 
Thales also produces electronic ID-management 
systems. In 2013, as a subcontractor for Oberthur 
Technologies (France), it supplied Uzbekistan 
with a border control system, consisting of 
“411 biometric data acquisition stations at 
locations throughout Uzbekistan and at its 
embassies around the world” and a centralised 
system that monitors passport applications and 
manages passport issuance. France purchased 
a “biometric enrolment and data transmission 
system”, while Morocco and Kenya are clients for 
Thales-produced identity cards.241
Under a £3.8 million contract with the UK 
Home Office Thales provided a public key 
infrastructure shared service system for the 
encryption of biometric and biographic data 
for Biometric Residence Permit (BRP) cards for 
non-EU foreigners.242
INDRA
Spanish technology and consulting firm Indra has 
‘Security & Defense’ as one of its core markets, 
which accounted for 19% (0,54 billion euros) of 
total revenues in 2015.243 Border security is an 
important part of this, with Indra claiming that its 
“systems protect more than 5,000 km of land and 
sea borders in several countries across various 
continents.”244 Already in 2008 it noted that 
“[g]rowth in both contracts and revenue remain 
high in this business area.”245
Indra’s Integrated System for Surveillance (SIVE: 
Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia) combines 
maritime traffic control, monitoring and 
surveillance.246 It is in use on most of the maritime 
borders of Spain, built up through several 
million-euro-contracts, as well as in Latvia, 
Portugal and Romania.247 Under a 25.5 million 
euros contract with Portugal, Indra started 
“deploying a stations network to detect the 
movement of ships within its field of influence”.228
In Romania, SIVE consists of “sensor stations 
equipped with radar systems and electro-
optics vision, a radio-link network and a control 
and command centre” to “integrate all the 
information collected by the sensor stations to 
create a common and unified scenario of the 
Romanian [Black Sea] coast to provide alerts 
to operators about possible threats”, including 
“illegal immigration”. The contract was worth 18 
million euros.249
According to Indra, “[b]order surveillance offers 
a great growth potential in the international 
market for Indra since SIVE’s effectiveness has 
already been proved. In addition there is a 
growing demand of this type of systems due to 
the increasing concern of governments to control 
their borders.”250
Indra was awarded a contract worth 1.4 million 
euros by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior 
to “include Morocco, The Gambia and Guinea 
Bissau in the Sea Horse Network cooperation 
programme”, by expanding and enhancing its 
“secure communication channels”.251
Indra is also supplying biometrics-based 
automated border control (ABC) systems, for 
example for airports and ports. Spain’s Smart 
Border-program, which is partly funded by the 
EU, has, since 2010, seen the gradual expanding 
use of Indra’s ABC-systems at airports. They are 
“comprised of a kiosk where passengers show 
their digital passport or other electronic ID”. 
Also using “digital fingerprint sensor[s] and facial 
recognition cameras”, “biometric information” 
is checked against “police databases” and the 
authenticity of “digital passports” is verified.252
On EU-level Indra is very active in lobbying and 
one of the major profiteers of R&T-funding 
for border security projects. It coordinates the 
high-profile projects ‘ABC4EU’, which aims to 
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update and integrate current ABC systems, and 
‘PERSEUS’.253 PERSEUS, which ran from 2011 to 
2014, was closely connected to the development 
of EUROSUR, its “purpose […] to build and 
demonstrate an EU maritime surveillance system 
integrating existing national and communitarian 
installations and enhancing them with innovative 
technologies.”254
SAFRAN
A large French aerospace and defence company, 
Safran has most of its border security work 
carried out by its subsidiary Morpho (formerly 
named Sagem Sécurité). Morpho specializes in 
electronic security solutions, with a focus on 
(biometric) identification systems. It is known for 
high spending on R&T, and is also a major player 
in EU funded research (see previous chapter). In 
2015 9.2% (1.6 billion euros) of the total revenues 
of Safran came from its ‘identity and security’ 
business.255
In February 2013, the European Commission 
awarded Morpho, in a consortium with Accenture 
and HP, a contract worth 70 million euros, 
for the maintenance of the European Vision 
Information System (VIS). This system is used to 
store and exchange (biometric) data relating to 
visa applications of third-country citizens.256 A 
few months later, Morpho signed a partnership 
agreement with Interpol, including “collaboration 
on the subject of border security” through the 
use of biometrics. Ronald Noble, Secretary 
General of Interpol, said working together with 
the private sector is essential.257
In 2009, Morpho signed a contract with IBM to 
supply multibiometric facial and fingerprint 
recognition technology to the British Home 
Office’s Identity and Passport Service, with the 
purpose of upgrading to biometric passports.258 
Fingerprint recognition technology of Morpho 
is also in use in automated border control 
gates at French airports, while iris recognition 
systems have been deployed at UK airports.259 
In 2015 Estonia contracted Morpho to supply 
an Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger 
Name Record (API-PNR) system, based on data 
collected by airlines from passengers. This was 
co-financed by the EU.260
Morpho delivered fingerprint scanners to 
Lithuania to process all visa requests at 
Lithuanian embassies. This system became 
part of VIS, with the biometric data stored in a 
database “available to border control authorities 
in countries that are part of the Schengen Area”, 
and was partly financed through the External 
Borders Fund.261
In the field of identity documents, Morpho is 
the sole supplier for Slovakia since 2015.262 In a 
consortium with Oberthur Technologies it is also 
the supplier of ePassports for Finland. Albania 
and The Netherlands are other European clients 
for Morpho ID documents.263
It’s not just biometrics for border security 
though. Safran supplied the Slovenian border 
police with infrared imagers, once again funded 
by the EU.264 And in 2010 Sagem and Kazakhstan 
Engineering started a joint venture to produce 
and market UAVs, for amongst others, border 
patrol missions.265
OTHER COMPANIES
Airbus, Finmeccanica, Indra, Safran and Thales 
each have a large share in the European border 
security market. There are of course dozens 
of other companies that have also supplied 
equipment and services to border security 
authorities.
BAE Systems in 2002 won a £7.6 million contract 
from Romania, to equip its border security 
authorities with Mobile Surveillance Vehicles 
(MSVs), hand-held thermal imagers and night 
vision binoculars. The contract also included 
training for Romanian patrol staff.266 In 2010, BAE 
Systems was working with Kent Police and the 
UK Border Agency on a project to develop drones 
for border monitoring, to the dismay of civil 
liberties organisations. For unknown reasons 
BAE terminated the project.267
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Swedish company Saab produces coastal and 
airborne surveillance systems and border 
management systems. It sold border security 
systems to Estonia, France, Greece, Sweden and 
the UK. These include radar-based surveillance 
systems for aircraft and ground use.268 In 
January 2016, Croatia awarded Saab a contract 
for a coastal surveillance and border protection 
system, to be operational in June.269
Siemens from Germany implemented a ‘National 
Border Management Information System’ 
for Croatia, co-financed by the European 
Commission.270 It also developed biometric-
based electronic ID documents for Switzerland 
and Spain. A special Siemens Biometrics Center in 
Graz, partly funded by the Austrian government, 
played an important role in this work.271
Atos, a Spanish company, did some work for 
Frontex, as mentioned before. In 2014, in a 
consortium with Accenture and HP, it won a 
three to four-year contract from the European 
Agency for Large-Scale IT System (eu-LISA) to 
maintain and enhance the second-generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II).272 It also 
developed a Homeland Security Suite (HSS)-
eGate, which is used in Switzerland and for 
border control in Bulgaria, and provided IT 
services to the UK Border Agency.273 In December 
2015, it was awarded a contract by the Spanish 
Guardia Civil to supply licence plate recognition 
for border control. This system is also installed 
on the borders of Ceuta and Mellila, the Spanish 
enclaves in Morocco.274
Unisys, already mentioned for two reports it 
wrote for the European Commission, was part 
of another consortium providing services to 
eu-LISA. A contract, worth approximately 47 
million euros, was awarded in October 2015, for 
the offering of “services to the agency to fulfil its 
mandate to provide operational management 
and evolve critical IT systems for internal security, 
border management and asylum management 
in EU.”275 Unisys is also responsible for the facial 
recognition system for the passport application 
process in the UK.276
Defendec, a surveillance technology company 
from the USA and Estonia, claims that its “main 
product, Smartdec [a remote monitoring system], 
is securing NATO’s and European Union’s 
external borders.”277 In 2011, the US Embassy 
in Albania donated Smartdec systems to the 
Albanian Border Guard.278 Apparently, it was a 
‘successful’ donation. “[I]mages of SMARTDEC 
cameras installed at green border (railway) with 
Montenegro enabled Albanian Border Police to 
detect four migrants who were attempting illegal 
border-crossing” reads the Western Balkans 
Annual Risk Analysis 2014 of Frontex. Estonia 
and Ukraine are also customers of Defendec.279
The Turkish Coast Guard purchased one 
Beechcraft King Air 350ER aircraft from Textron 
(USA) for border patrol missions.280 In 2015 the 
Slovakian border guard tested binoculars and 
night vision equipment from British company 
Thermoteknix.281
ISRAELI COMPANIES
Israel has a special place as the only non-
European country from which companies are 
eligible for EU R&T funding under the Framework 
Programmes.282 The companies also have a 
unique selling strategy, capitalising on their 
involvement in Israeli border security, including 
the Separation wall on the West Bank and the 
fence on the border with Egypt. In general, 
equipment and technology of Israeli arms and 
security companies are internationally acclaimed 
because they are considered ‘battlefield 
proven’.283
RBTec Electronic Security Systems from Israel, 
which was selected by Frontex to participate in 
its April 2014 workshop on ‘Border Surveillance 
Sensors and Platforms’, boasted in its application 
mail that its “technologies, solutions and products 
are installed on Israeli-Palestinian border”. 
At the end of the summer of 2015 Bulgaria and 
Hungary indicated they were looking into the 
possibility of buying Israeli-designed border 
fences. Those would be based on the fence on 
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the border with Egypt, with a cost of up to $1.9 
million per kilometre. “I cannot give you any 
details right now, but I think that we have taken 
from the Israeli experiences as much as we can”, 
said Bulgaria’s deputy ambassador in Israel, 
Rayko Pepelanov.284
Elta, a subsidiary of the state-owned Israel 
Aerospace Industries, at the end of 2015 was 
in contact with several European governments 
on its ‘Virtual Border Patrol’-system, based 
on social media monitoring and intercepting 
mobile phone communications. Amnon Sofrin, 
homeland security projects manager of Elta and 
former head of the Intelligence Branch of the 
Mossad said that the balance between individual 
rights and national security needs to be shifted 
to the latter.285
In 2015, Switzerland ordered six UAVs from Elbit 
for surveillance missions by border guards, for 
approximately 230 million euros.286 The deal was 
criticised because the same model, the Hermes 
900, is used by Israel for attacking Palestinians.287 
Without naming specific countries, Elbit writes 
it also performs “programs relating to border 
security projects, coastal surveillance systems 
and integrated airport security systems for 
European and other governments.”288
DETENTION AND DEPORTATION
Detention in and forced returns from the EU of 
refugees go beyond the scope of this report. 
It is good to understand however that those 
practices also provide business opportunities 
for industry. Multinational security company 
G4S is a notorious profiteer. It used to carry out 
deportations in the UK, until three of its security 
guards were accused of killing Jimmy Mubenga 
on a flight to Angola. They were later cleared of 
manslaughter in a verdict that was criticised by 
several human rights groups. Oliver Sprague 
from Amnesty International UK, said: “Ill-trained 
and unaccountable staff should not be carrying 
out enforced removals and it is little wonder there 
are so many reports of improper treatment.”289 
G4S still runs detention and removal prisons 
in the UK however and provides prison guards 
and other services for such centres in Austria, 
Estonia and Norway (and formerly also The 
Netherlands).290 “G4S’s success in this market 
shows that deportation, detention and border 
control have become big business”, according to 
Danish researcher Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(Danish Institute for Human Rights).291
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The European military and security industry 
profits on both sides of the refugee tragedy. It 
delivers arms and other equipment that fuel 
conflicts, human rights violations and repression 
in parts of the world most refugees originate 
from. And it sells border security and control 
equipment to keep them out of the EU.
Some of Europe’s largest arms producers, notably 
Airbus, Finmeccanica and Thales, are prominent 
examples of this cynical business. Extensive 
lobbying by them and others, including Indra and 
Safran, gained them an influential voice in the 
development of EU policies on and responses 
to immigration, focusing on border security and 
border control, and funding connected to these 
fields. They then have profited from the lucrative 
contracts that have resulted from the increasing 
militarisation of Europe’s borders.
The EU disregards its role in creating and 
maintaining an unjust global economic system 
and the role of its foreign policies as well as 
its prominent arms dealers in fuelling conflict 
and repression. Its primary answer to the 
recent refugee tragedy has been to invest in 
border security with more military involvement. 
Europe’s burgeoning military and security 
industry, already booming on the back of the 
war on terror, have been all too glad to profit. 
And with bitter irony, the profiteers have even 
included the same companies that are part of 
the problem, those that sell arms and security 
equipment to the Middle East and North Africa.
The people who suffer from this racket are 
the refugees who experience the horrifying 
consequences of these policies and practices. 
They are stopped at borders, forcing them to 
either stay in inhumane circumstances in transit 
countries, return to even more difficult situations 
in their countries of origin or try more dangerous 
routes to find their way into Europe. While some 
refugees indeed are granted licenses to stay 
and the possibility of building a safe future, 
a great number end up in terrible conditions in 
transit countries, dead in the Mediterranean, 
in a permanent state of illegality (suffering 
insecurity and exploitation), or facing detention 
or deportation.
The EU has been severely criticised for its 
border security policy, and especially its ongoing 
militarisation, by the UN, human rights and 
refugee support organisations. Its treatment of 
refugees violates human rights, including the 
fundamental right to seek asylum, and is contrary 
to international law. Yet it keeps moving forward 
on the same inhumane, violent path.
The EU needs to change its course and put the 
lives and fundamental rights of refugees first. 
It needs to acknowledge its part in fuelling the 
drivers for migration, and work on taking them 
away. Important steps in this context would be 
to establish and maintain an embargo on arms 
sales to the Middle East and North Africa and to 
end military involvement in this region, changing 
to a focus on diplomacy, support for democratic 
opposition forces, conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution. Money wasted on heightening the 
walls of Fortress Europe, which serve mainly 
military and security companies’ profits, could be 
better invested on efforts in this field. 
Refugees trying to find safety and a liveable 
future should be welcomed to the EU and find 
assistance here. The EU needs to set up safe 
routes for them, instead of forcing them on 
dangerous journeys to avoid border security. 
The increase and militarisation of border 
security should be halted and reversed, as well 
as the pressure on third countries to function as 
border guards for Europe. Instead of listening to 
the military and security industry’s lobbying for 
ever more monstrous border security projects, 
the EU needs to honour its human rights and 
international law obligations and provide 
refugees with the support they need.
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ANNEX 1 
PARTICIPANTS IN EOS AND SDA MEETINGS  
ON BORDER SECURITY AND BORDER CONTROL
PARTICIPANTS IN EOS ORGANIZED MEETINGS
High Level Security Roundtable – Brussels, 9 February 2011
EU: Council of the EU, European Commission (including three Commissioners), European Defence Agency, Europol, one MEP
Member States authorities: France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, UK
Industry: Airbus, ASD, Avio, Atos, BAE Systems, CEA, Conceptivity, CORTE, Diehl, Engineering Ingegneria Informatica, EOS, 
Finmeccanica, Fraunhofer, G4S, IBM, Indra, KEMEA, Raytheon, SAAB, Safran, Siemens, Smiths Detection, STM, Thales, TNO, 
Vitec
EOS – SDA Conference ‘A new partnership for European Security’ – Brussels, 10 February 2011
EU: Council of the EU, ENISA, European Commission, European Commission – Joint Research Centre, European Council, 
European Defence Agency, European Parliament, European Union Military Staff, three MEPs
Member States authorities: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Romania, Sweden, UK
Industry: ADS Group, Airbus, Altran, Arcadis Vectra, ASD, Atos Origin, Avio, BAE Systems, Baker R&C/Ecorys, BNP Paribas 
Fortis, Brunswick Group, CEA, Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), Conceptivity, Conrad, D’appolonia, DCNS, EMC 
Consulting Group, Engineering Ingegneria Informatica S.p.A., EOS, EquipEuropa, Eupportunity, Euralia, European Corporate 
Security Association, European Express Association, European Voice, Everis, Finmeccanica, Fleishmann-Hillard, Fraunhofer, 
Frequentis Nachrichtentechnik, G4S, GCV Overberg, GeoTec, Hawk ISM, IABG, IB Consultancy, IBM, ID Partners, Indra, Isdefe, 
KEMEA, KfW Group, L-3 Communication Systems, Lockheed Martin, Luciad, Mind-Alliance Systems, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
Raytheon, Rohde & Schwarz, SAAB, Safran, SDA, Siemens, Smiths Group, Spanish Electronics, Information Technology and 
Telecommunications Industries As , Steria Benelux, Symantec, Tecnalia Research & Innovation, Telecom Italia, Thales, TNO, 
Turkish Industry and Business Association, Vitec Multimedia, Weber Shandwick, ZANASI Alessandro
High Level Security Roundtable – Brussels, 21 March 2012
EU: Council of the EU, European Commission (including four Commissioners), European Defence Agency, European 
Parliament (including 5 MEPs), Europol, Frontex
Member States authorities: France, Germany, UK
Industry: ASD, Airbus, Altran, Amper, Atos, Avio, BAE Systems, CEA, CORTE, Conceptivity, DCNS, Edisoft, Engineering Ingegneria 
Informatica, EOS, Finmeccanica, FOI, Fraunhofer, G4S, IABG, IBM, Indra, L-3 Communications, Multix, Rapiscan, SAAB, Safran, 
Securitas, Siemens, Smiths Detection, Thales, TNO, UTRC Europe
PARTICIPANTS IN SDA ORGANISED MEETINGS
Roundtable ‘Borders & People: The liberty and security balance’ – Brussels, 24 April 2006
EU: European Commission, European Defence Agency, European Union Military Staff, Frontex, one MEP
Member States authorities: Germany, UK
Industry: Airbus, BAE Systems, Boeing, Ericsson, Fleishman-Hillard, Frost & Sullivan, IBM, Motorola, Northrop Grumman, 
Rafael, SAAB, SDA, Thales, TNO, Volvo Group, Weber Shandwick
Roundtable ‘Fine-tuning EU border security’ – Brussels, 29 September 2010292
EU: Council of the EU, European Commission,  
European Defence Agency, European Parliament
Member States authorities: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, UK
Industry: AeroStrategies, Airbus, Capgemini, Command Consulting Group, Conrad, ESISC, Fleishman-Hillard, KLM, OCMC 
European Affairs, PDC EU Affairs, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Raytheon, SAAB, Safran, Sandstone, Schiphol Group, Schuman 
Associates, SDA, Symantec, Thales, United Technologies
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ANNEX 2  
LOBBYING INFORMATION AS DECLARED  
TO THE EU TRANSPARENCY REGISTER293
(information compiled by Corporate Europe Observatory)
Name company / organisation Updated on Lobby costs Year Lobbyists declared
Airbus 20-04-2016  1.75mn-2mn 2015 6.5fte (12)
Airbus 29-04-2015 400,000-500,000 2014 10fte (10)
Airbus 04-12-2014 450,000-500,000 2013 13
Airbus 09-07-2013 4.25mn-4.5mn 2012 13
Airbus 26-06-2012 500,000-600,000 2011 11
Finmeccanica 30-03-2016 200,000-300,000 2014 4fte (4)
Finmeccanica 29-04-2015 <10,000 2013 2.25fte (3)
Finmeccanica 16-06-2014 250,000-300,000 2012 6
Finmeccanica 22-09-2013 250,000-300,000 2011 4
Finmeccanica 17-02-2012 250,000-300,000 2010 4
Thales 25-03-2016 300,000 2014 2.5fte (6)
Thales 29-04-2015 300,000 2013 2.5fte (6)
Thales 08-02-2013 300,000 2012 5
Thales 17-02-2012 300,000 2011 5
Indra 16-03-2016 900,000-1mn 2014 5fte (5)
Indra 29-04-2015 100,000-200,000 2013 4.5fte (5)
Indra294 17-09-2013 250,000-300,000 2012 3
Safran 25-03-2016 495,000 2015 5.5fte (7)
Safran 29-04-2015 495,000 2014 5.5fte (7)
Safran 04-03-2014 495,000 2013 50
Safran 28-02-2013 372,000 2012 50
Safran 07-03-2012 277,000 2011 50
Safran 17-02-2012 277,000 2010 50
European Organisation for Security 09-04-2016 200,000-300,000 2015 8fte (8)
European Organisation for Security 02-04-2016 200,000-300,000 2014 8fte (8)
European Organisation for Security 06-03-2014 50,000-100,000 2013 4
European Organisation for Security 06-04-2013 50,000-100,000 2012 4
European Organisation for Security 20-02-2013 350,000-400,000 2011 5
European Organisation for Security 19-03-2012 350,000-400,000 2011 3
AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe 04-09-2015 298,000 2014 1.75fte (7)
AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe 24-02-2014 150,000-200,000 2013 11
AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe 08-02-2013 1.5mn-1.75mn 2012 11
AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe 17-02-2012 1.5mn-1.75mn 2011 11
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ANNEX 3 
PARTICIPANTS IN MEETINGS BETWEEN  
FRONTEX AND INDUSTRY295
Date Meeting Participating companies and institutions
6 December 2013 Technology Showroom ATERMES (France), Cassidian Optronics (Airbus, Germany), George Mason 
University (USA), IABG (Germany), Indra Sistemas (Spain), Inmarsat Global 
Government (UK), NetBio (USA), Palantir Technologies (UK),
10 April 2014 Border Surveillance Sensors and 
Platforms Workshop
BATS (Belgium), Cassidian (Airbus, Germany), Elctrac System Spólka (Poland, 
observers), IABG (Germany), Plasan (Israel, observers), RBtec Electronic Security 
Systems (Israel, observers), Selex ES (Finmeccanica, Italy), Sky Sapience (Israel)296, 
Textron (USA), Thales (France), Unitronex Poland (Poland), Universidad Politécna 
de Madrid (Spain), URMtec (Poland, observers)
22/23 May 2014 European Day For Border Guards Airbus Defence and Space (UK), AIT Austran Institute of Technology (Austrua), Alfa 
Imaging (Spain), CEA (France), Da Vinci Laboratory Solutions (Netherlands), DCNS 
(France), GMV (Spain), Indra Sistemas (Spain), Istuto Superiore Mario Boella (Italy), 
Morpho (Safran, France), piXlogic (USA)297, Queen’s University Belfast (UK), SAAB 
(Sweden), Selex ES (Finmeccanica, Italy), University of Brescia (Italy), VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (Finland)298
31 October and 3 
November 2014
Meeting with industry Analytical Graphics AGI (UK), Avincis Mission Critical Services (Babcock, UK), 
Defendec (Estonia), Elbit (Israel), Group 2000 (Netherlands), HGH Infrared 
Systems (France), IABG (Germany), Indra Sistemas (Spain), MDA (Canada), 
Optimal Aircraft Design (Belgium), SAS (UK), SES (Luxembourg)
Late 2014 Workshop on R&D projects 
run and financed by industry 
and academia for developing 
solutions, technologies and 
products for border security
Eskadra (Poland), Fraunhofer (Germany), Furono Finland (Finland), IABG 
(Germany), National Center for Scientific Research Demokritos (Greece), Polus 
Europe (Slovakia), Technical University of Catalonia (Spain)
27 March and 9 
April 2015
Meeting with industry Airbus Defence and Space (Germany), Luciad (Belgium), S2 Global (USA), Sysnav 
(France), Transas Marine International (Ireland)
30 April 2015 Workshop on the use of border 
security technologies and the 
implications on the privacy, 
ethics and data protection / 
fundamental rights of people 
crossing the borders
Eticas Research and Consulting (Spain)
19 November 2015 Workshop on research and 
development projects aimed 
at developing new products, 
technologies, solutions for 
border security, using financial 
sources other than EU financing
DFRC (Switzerland), FTL Secure Solutions (UK), Indra Sistemas (Spain), Vecara 
(Germany)
ANNEX 4 
LIST OF BORDER SECURITY AND CONTROL PROJECTS WITH EU FUNDING
3D FACE
ABC4EU
ACXIS
AEROCEPTOR
AMASS
ARGUS 3D
BODEGA
BS-UAV
C-BORD
CASSANDRA
CLOSEYE
CONSORTIS
CONTAIN
DOGGIES
DOLPHIN
EFFISEC
ESSTRT
EWISA
FASTPASS
FIDELITY
GLOBE
GMOSAIC
GMOSS
HANDHOLD
HUMBOLDT
I2C
INGRESS
LIMES
LOBOS
MARISS
MOBILEPASS
NEREIDS
OPARUS
OPERAMAR
ORIGINS
PERSEUS
SAGRES
SEABILLA
SECCONDD
SECTRONIC
SIMTISYS
SNIFFER
SNIFFLES
SNOOPY
SOBCAH
STABORSEC
STRAW
SUNNY
SUPPORT
TALOS
TANGO
TERASCREEN
TRITON
VIRTUOSO
WIMAAS
XP-DITE
Border wars |  48
ANNEX 5 
HORIZON 2020 BORDER SECURITY PROJECTS (2014–2020)
Description Indicative budget (mln €)
BES-1-2015 Radar systems for the surveillance of coastal and pre-frontier areas and in support of 
search and rescue operations
4–8
BES-2-2015 Affordable and easily deployable technologies for EU coastal border surveillance with 
reduced impact on the environment
3–5
BES-3-2015 Light optionally piloted vehicles (and sensors) for maritime surveillance 5–12
BES-5-2015 Novel mobility concepts for land border security 2–5
BES-6-2015 Exploring new modalities in biometric-based border checks 3–5
BES-7-2015 Optimization of border control processes and planning 1–2
BES-14-2014 Human factors in border control 2–5
SEC-14-BES-2016 Towards reducing the cost of technologies in land border security applications 5
SEC-15-BES-2017 Risk-based screening at border crossing 8
SEC-16-BES-2017 Through-foliage detection, including in the outermost regions of the EU 8
SEC-18-BES-2017 Acceptance of “no gate crossing point solutions” 3
SEC-19-BES-2016 Data fusion for maritime security applications 8
SEC-20-BES-2016 Border security: autonomous systems and control systems 8
ANNEX 6 
FRONTEX’ LOW VALUE CONTRACTS
Year Description Company Value
2010299 Document forgery detection equipment Foster & Freeman (UK) €45,445
2011300 Implementation of the Border-TechNet application GMV Aerospace and Defence (Spain) €28,000
2012301
EU satellite training for Frontex European Union Satellite Centre (Spain) €20,000
Frontex Positioning System phase II Atos (Spain) €22,500
2013302 Media training for officers taking part in Joint Operations coordinated by Frontex
Cameron Communications (UK) €15,935
2014303
Consultancy - utilization of internet and social media for 
predictive analysis of migration to the EU
IHS Global (UK) €44,000
Schengen borders e-learning tool XRC Services (The Netherlands) €54,993
2015304
Consultancy on scenario development in the field of 
border management.
Scenario Management International (Germany) €54,980
Purchase of Stabilised NVG and Daylight Binoculars MSS Advanced Technologies (The Netherlands) €57,100
Rental of vehicles for Frontex operational activities in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Greece
BJ’S (UK) €27,842
Purchase of the Digital Surface Model along the EU 
borders
Geosystems Polska (Poland) €58,995
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This report highlights how there is one group of interests that have benefited 
from the refugee tragedy within Europe and in particular from the European 
Union’s investment in ‘securing’ its borders. They are the military and security 
companies that provide the equipment to border guards, the surveillance 
technology to monitor frontiers, and the IT infrastructure to track population 
movements. Taking advantage of an expected €29 billion yearly budget by 
2022, some of the largest winners of border security contracts are perversely 
the arms companies that sell the most arms to the Middle East.
